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1371 
Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the 
Internet Era 
Nathan Cortez 
Nearly forty years ago, Ernest Gellhorn documented the potentially 
devastating impact that can occur when federal agencies issue adverse 
publicity about private parties. Based on his article, the Administrative 
Conference of the United States recommended that courts, Congress, 
and agencies hold agencies to clear standards for issuing such publicity. 
In the decades since, some agencies have adopted standards, but most 
have not, and neither the courts nor Congress has intervened to impose 
standards. Today, agencies continue to use countless forms of publicity to 
pressure alleged regulatory violators and to amplify their overall 
enforcement powers—all without affording due process or other 
procedural safeguards that attach to more formal actions. 
This Article renews the call for standards given four developments 
since 1973. First, agencies now have even more incentives to issue 
adverse publicity and eschew more formal statutory enforcement 
actions. Second, new media give agencies more ways to issue adverse 
publicity, for example, by making announcements via their websites, 
Facebook, or Twitter. Third, new media make it easier for audiences to 
misread or mischaracterize an agency’s message. Finally, hyper-
responsive capital markets now process adverse publicity more swiftly 
and hastily, multiplying the potential for damage.  
In light of these developments, and after reviewing agency practices 
and litigation since 1973, this Article revisits the earlier 
recommendations. It calls for agencies to constrain themselves with 
published standards, for Congress to recognize that publicity used as a 
sanction is “final agency action,” and for courts to review adverse 
publicity for an “abuse of discretion.” Agencies should retain wide 
discretion to communicate with the public, but should be held 
accountable if they abuse that discretion. To counterbalance this 
restraint on agencies, Congress should enhance their statutory 
 
   Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. J.D., 
Stanford, B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I thank Alan Bromberg, Jeff Gaba, Julian Davis 
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enforcement powers and resources, so that agencies do not need to rely on 
extrastatutory tactics like adverse publicity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2003, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publicly 
condemned a drug company for exaggerating the safety and efficacy 
of its cancer drug.1 The FDA communicated its objections via a Talk 
 
 1. FDA, Talk Paper T03-18: FDA Warns Public About Misrepresentations in 
Marketing Claims About Drug to Treat Cancer (Mar. 14, 2003). 
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Paper posted on its website, calling the company’s statements 
“misleading,” “demonstrably false,” and “particularly egregious.”2 
Within hours, the company’s stock price fell nearly 25%.3 The FDA 
reportedly did not notify the company of its objections beforehand.4  
Many years earlier, in 1973, Ernest Gellhorn documented how 
adverse publicity by federal agencies can devastate products, 
companies, or even entire industries.5 His article accompanied a 
report for the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS), which together recommended that agencies adopt 
standards for issuing adverse publicity, and that courts and Congress 
hold agencies accountable.6 Yet, in the decades since, very few 
agencies have adopted standards. Courts have been exceedingly 
reluctant to restrain agencies’ discretion to issue adverse publicity in 
any meaningful way. Congress has not intervened. And scholarly 
attention remains scant.7  
Today, federal agencies continue to use press releases and 
countless other forms of publicity to identify and pressure alleged 
regulatory violators—and to amplify their overall statutory 
enforcement powers. This can be problematic on a number of levels. 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. William W. Vodra, Nathan G. Cortez, & David E. Korn, The Food and Drug 
Administration’s Evolving Regulation of Press Releases: Limits and Challenges, 61 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 623, 649 (2006); FDA Responds In Kind to SuperGen: Talk Paper Answers Press 
Release, “THE PINK SHEET,” Mar. 17, 2003 at 7. 
 4. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. 
 5. Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1380 (1973). 
 6. Administrative Conference of the United States, Conference Recommendation No. 
73-1 (adopted June 8, 1973); Rules and Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (June 27, 1973) 
(to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305). Both Professor Gellhorn and ACUS define “adverse 
agency publicity” as an affirmative statement made by an agency that calls attention to an 
agency action or policy and adversely affects an identified party. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 
1381. 
 7. Since Professor Gellhorn’s study, only a few articles have revisited the problem, 
usually as part of an analysis ancillary to another issue. See, e.g., Eugene I. Lambert, Recalls, 
Regulatory Letters, and Publicity—Quasi-Statutory Remedies, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 360 
(1976); Richard S. Morey, Publicity as a Regulatory Tool, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 469 
(1975); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of 
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 874; James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded 
Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN 
L. REV. 835 (2002) [hereinafter O’Reilly, The 411 on 515]; James T. O’Reilly, Libels on 
Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 
507 (2003) [hereinafter O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites]; Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1374 
Agency publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading, or just 
plain wrong. Agencies can make announcements without providing 
due process or other procedural safeguards required for more formal 
enforcement actions. Most agencies do not have clear statutory 
authority to issue adverse publicity, particularly when used to punish 
or sanction. And courts generally find that agency publicity is either 
not reviewable or reviewable but not redressable. Agencies thus 
enjoy almost boundless discretion to brandish adverse publicity. 
These problems have been compounded by four developments 
since 1973. First, because modern agencies are so bogged down by 
procedural requirements and formal oversight, they have even more 
incentives to issue adverse publicity and eschew more formal, 
statutorily authorized enforcement actions. Moreover, agencies often 
lack sufficient statutory authority or adequate resources (or some 
combination of both) to police violators. Adverse publicity can be 
strikingly convenient and effective compared to other enforcement 
tools, making its allure clear to overburdened agencies. 
Second, agencies have many more ways to disseminate adverse 
publicity today, thanks to the Internet and new media. Every federal 
agency has a website through which it can post press releases, news 
updates, enforcement actions, and other material that regulated 
companies would find to be negative or adverse to them in some 
way. My review of FDA practices, for example, found that the agency 
makes public announcements identifying specific products or 
companies in over two dozen different formats. And agencies now 
utilize podcasts, Internet news feeds, and even Facebook and Twitter 
accounts, which allow them to make announcements more quickly—
and more casually—than ever. 
Third, partly due to these first two developments, audiences now 
have more opportunities to misread, misinterpret, or mischaracterize 
agency announcements. The announcements themselves are more 
truncated. And recipients can forward, link to, repost, and retweet 
agency announcements with strikingly little effort. Mistakes are easily 
multiplied. 
Finally, capital markets and other audiences now process adverse 
publicity more quickly and perhaps more hastily. Adverse publicity 
can have a snowball effect, not only in an amorphous reputational 
sense, but more tangibly by depressing stock prices, as in the 
example above. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), explained in 
Part III.D below, lends some theoretical explanatory power here, 
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and might also offer empirical ways to measure the effects of adverse 
publicity through “event studies.” 
Together, these four developments suggest that we revisit the 
use of adverse publicity by federal agencies. I begin by looking back 
at what agencies did in response to the ACUS recommendation—
virtually nothing—and consider how agencies have both exercised 
their discretion and defended themselves in litigation, examining 
twenty-six federal court opinions since 1973 that challenged an 
agency’s use of adverse publicity. I find that courts routinely hold 
that agency publicity is not reviewable and not redressable under the 
APA. 
I conduct an in-depth case study of the FDA because it featured 
prominently in Gellhorn’s article, it was the one agency that actually 
proposed rules in response to ACUS (though it never finalized 
them), and the FDA has litigated a number of cases since 1973 
defending its use of adverse publicity. The FDA also has a very 
compelling case that it needs to warn the public despite imperfect 
information and scientific uncertainty, making it a good case study 
for testing reforms. 
My review makes a few noteworthy observations. For example, 
the FDA relies on a medley of nonbinding guidance documents and 
employee manuals that address public announcements and media 
relations. However, none of these documents confront the long-
standing concerns with adverse publicity.  
The FDA also issues adverse or negative publicity in over two 
dozen different formats, including press releases, warning letters, and 
a mélange of advisories, alerts, notifications, and updates—not to 
mention multiple Twitter feeds and the voluminous information it 
releases on its website.  
Moreover, after reviewing just one form of FDA publicity (“press 
announcements”) over the last seven years, I find that (i) the FDA 
issued over 1500 press announcements during that period, or almost 
one per business day; (ii) 65% of these announcements identify a 
specific product, company, or individual; (iii) 62% of this subgroup 
are adverse or negative in some way; and (iv) 74% of that subgroup 
publicize pending or preliminary agency actions, rather than final or 
determinative actions.8 Thus, looking at just one of many forms of 
publicity that the FDA uses, a large proportion (30%) are 
 
 8. See infra notes 256–59 and accompanying text. 
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individualized, negative, and preliminary. Yet, the FDA does not 
hold itself to written policies, does not offer procedural safeguards to 
the parties singled out, and consistently takes the litigating position 
that its announcements are not reviewable by courts. 
After considering the FDA in depth, the Article also considers 
cases involving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer Products 
Safety Commission (CPSC), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and other agencies. Although these examples 
offer variations on the FDA’s story—for example, the FTC restrains 
itself through internal policies, and the CPSC adheres to clear 
congressional directives—they otherwise confirm some of the long-
standing concerns, suggesting that the problems might stretch across 
the federal bureaucracy. 
So what is the answer? As a baseline, agencies obviously must be 
able to communicate with the public. They must have wide 
discretion to issue warnings and alerts in the face of scientific 
uncertainty and imperfect information. And they should be able to 
use modern means to do so. But agency discretion should not be 
boundless, particularly when used to sanction.  
I address my recommendations to three parties: agencies, 
Congress, and courts. I tailor these recommendations based on 
agency practices since 1973, judicial opinions published since 1973, 
and the four developments above. Agencies should articulate written 
standards for issuing different forms of adverse publicity, particularly 
via new media. These standards should address the content of 
announcements and establish both internal procedures for issuing 
publicity and procedures for private parties to request corrections or 
retractions through timely administrative appealsall subject to 
reasonable exceptions for emergencies and other justifications in the 
public interest. Agency self-restraint is perhaps the most effective and 
most realistic response. 
Congress should create a baseline set of expectations, perhaps by 
amending the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9 The statute 
should explicitly authorize agencies to issue adverse publicity, and 
should delegate the responsibility to each agency to codify its own 
procedures for self-restraint. Moreover, Congress should declare that 
adverse publicity is “final agency action” under the APA and is 
 
 9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2006).  
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reviewable for an abuse of discretion, as this seems like a classic case 
for that standard. If these changes unduly hamper the ability of 
agencies to encourage compliance and enforce their regulatory 
schemes, then Congress should authorize more efficient statutory 
enforcement mechanisms and should grant agencies the resources to 
use them. 
Finally, until Congress intervenes, courts should recognize that 
publicity intended at least in part as a sanction should be reviewable 
as final agency action under the APA. Parties aggrieved by agency 
publicity need not exhaust administrative remedies because typically 
there are none. And courts should recognize a cause of action under 
the APA or via procedural due process, if applicable. 
This Article makes these arguments in four parts, focusing on 
how federal agencies wield adverse publicity.10 Part II describes the 
basic problem and how Gellhorn and ACUS recommended 
responding to it, counterposing agency motivations and public 
benefits with the risks to private parties. In Parts III and IV, I 
describe the aftermath. Part III examines the four developments 
since 1973. Part IV then surveys what agencies have done since 
1973, using the FDA as a case study and examining over two dozen 
judicial opinions in which a party challenged a federal agency’s use of 
publicity. Given these findings, Part V updates the call for standards, 
urging agencies, Congress, and courts to check agency discretion. 
Admittedly, it can be difficult to generalize about how agencies 
use publicity because it is so varied, informal, and discretionary.11 But 
 
 10. Note that agencies often use press releases and other forms of publicity for other 
reasons that I will not cover in this Article. For example, in Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 
876, 878–879 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit invalidated the EPA’s attempt to announce 
in a press release a binding new policy that it should have promulgated through notice and 
comment rulemaking. And, of course, state agencies may also use publicity inappropriately. See, 
e.g., Cox v. N. Va. Transp. Comm’n, 551 F.2d 555, 557–58 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
state agency employee was deprived of due process after agency commissioners granted 
interviews attributing employee’s termination to financial scandal at agency and employee was 
denied request for hearing); Dixon v. Pa. Crime Comm’n, 67 F.R.D. 425, 429 n.4, 430 
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (finding no due process violation despite state crime commission publicizing 
investigation and releasing audit reports); Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Assembly Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations, 425 F. Supp. 909, 915–16 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding legislative 
investigation and attendant adverse publicity surrounding it were caused as much by lawsuit 
challenging it as the investigation itself). However, this Article limits its focus to federal 
agencies. 
 11. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 837–38; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal 
Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 839 n.9 (1989) (noting in his examination of how the 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1378 
it continues to be one of the more coercive actions an agency can 
take.12 This Article thus takes a fresh look at how modern agencies 
use modern media against modern regulated parties, and what 
standards should apply.  
II. BOUNDLESS DISCRETION AND THE NEED FOR STANDARDS 
Gellhorn analyzed a series of high-profile incidents in which 
agency publicity devastated a company, a product, or even an 
industry. His was not the first to address the topic,13 but it 
accompanied an ACUS recommendation published in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. Gellhorn’s primary concern was that agencies 
issued publicity “without articulated standards or safeguards.”14 Yet, 
despite the call for action, few standards or safeguards exist. 
A. Agency Motivations and Public Benefits 
Agencies have many motivations for issuing adverse publicity, 
and these motivations have not changed considerably since 1973. 
Agencies continue to issue publicity primarily to inform, to warn, or 
to sanction.15 The first two do not provoke much debate—many 
agencies are required by statute to inform and warn the public,16 and 
publicity is an efficient way to do so.17 Indeed, some agencies 
 
Federal Reserve Board bargains that the “malleability of informal decision-making makes it 
difficult to study, but extremely important to the everyday functioning of an agency”); Noah, 
supra note 7, at 897 (proposing a typology for scrutinizing agency “arm-twisting” and 
acknowledging that any such typology would be oversimplified).  
 12. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836–37. 
 13. See, e.g., Michael R. Lemov, Administrative Agency News Releases: Public 
Information Versus Private Injury, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 63 (1968); Note, Disparaging 
Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1512 (1967); Note, The Distinction Between 
Informing and Prosecutorial Investigations: A Functional Justification for “Star Chamber” 
Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 1227 (1963).  
 14. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1381. 
 15. As Professor Gellhorn emphasized, agencies often issue adverse publicity for more 
than one reason. Id. at 1382.  
 16. Consumer Product Safety Commission Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b) (2006) 
(requiring the CPSC to “protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury” and “assist 
consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products”); Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 375(b) (2006) (requiring the FDA to issue 
publicity when the agency believes there is “imminent danger to health, or gross deception of 
the consumer”). 
 17. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1383. 
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essentially exist to inform and warn the public.18 Very few would 
argue, for example, that the SEC should not warn about major 
investment frauds, or that the FDA should not warn about 
hazardous products. We need agencies to alert the public. 
But publicity can also serve as a form of sanction (whether 
intended or not), when it punishes, deters, or coerces.19 The severity 
depends on how sensitive the firm is to public disapproval,20 and 
perhaps whether the firm is publicly traded and thus sensitive to 
investor reactions. Some agencies like the SEC gained notoriety for 
sanctioning companies this way.21 
Agencies can also use publicity as an extrastatutory way to 
amplify their statutory enforcement powers.22 Some use the threat of 
adverse publicity to make up for their limited statutory enforcement 
authority and the difficulty of proving violations.23 Agencies also use 
adverse publicity as a more efficient pressure point to achieve goals 
authorized by statute.24 Adverse publicity—or simply the threat of 
it—often precedes or accompanies formal enforcement actions.  
Agencies also defend their use of publicity as a way to 
authoritatively state the agency’s positions and ensure that media 
coverage is accurate.25 This use obviously can benefit the public, as 
 
 18. Id. at 1394 (stating that issuing publicity “is the essence of [the SEC’s] statutory 
purpose”).  
 19. Id. at 1383. 
 20. Id. It is debatable whether corporations can be punished or deterred the same way 
as individuals. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON 
CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: 
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 
(1981); Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under 
the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387 (1992). 
 21. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1406, n.107 (noting that the Cost of Living Council and 
SEC gained attention for aggressively issuing adverse publicity as a sanction). 
 22. Id. at 1398–1401. 
 23. Id. at 1398–99 (citing “civil rights commissions and agencies encouraging fair 
employment practices,” including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which 
has a “broad mandate and limited enforcement powers”). 
 24. Noah, supra note 7, at 876. 
 25. See, e.g., SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION NO. OIG-
534: ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER COORDINATION BETWEEN THE SEC AND OTHER 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES CONCERNING THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST 
GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. 62 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
foia/docs/oig-534.pdf [hereinafter SEC OIG]; FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 
42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“On a 
number of occasions, FDA has issued publicity to prevent rumors and confusion.”); Gellhorn, 
supra note 5, at 1390. 
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agencies often apply byzantine regulatory schemes to highly 
technical industries, which may be difficult for the lay public to 
understand.  
Agencies may target publicity to their constituents. Publicizing 
enforcement actions is a way to remind Congress and the White 
House that agencies are fulfilling their mandates,26 and that they 
deserve every cent of their budgets. Moreover, publicity can also 
appease interest groups that push for greater oversight.27 
Finally, agencies use publicity because it is convenient. As 
Gellhorn noted, “[p]ublicity is quicker and cheaper; it is not 
presently subject to judicial review or other effective legal control; 
and it involves the exercise of pure administrative discretion.”28 For 
overburdened agencies, the allure of publicity is clear, particularly 
compared to more formal actions. 
Although some refer to the practice as a guerilla tactic or a lesser 
form of blackmail,29 in most cases, agencies are acting upon several 
motivationsmost of them perfectly legitimate.  
B. The Risks to Private Parties 
Several incidents inspired Gellhorn and ACUS. For example, in 
1959 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) held a 
press conference warning the public not to buy cranberries from 
Washington and Oregon because they might be contaminated with 
carcinogens.30 He neglected to clarify that cranberries from other 
states were safe, and punctuated his warning by stating that he 
personally would not be eating cranberries for Thanksgiving.31 That 
holiday season, “virtually the entire crop remained unsold, even 
though 99% of it was subsequently cleared and marketed as 
government approved.”32 The industry lost $21.5 million worth of 
surplus, which ultimately led Congress to indemnify growers $8.5 
 
 26. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1393 (noting that adverse publicity by the FTC 
“occasionally appears to be influenced as much by the desire to enhance its political position as 
by legitimate policy considerations”).  
 27. Id. at 1399 (noting that EEOC employees admitted to using more pejorative 
language in press statements to cater to constituent groups). 
 28. Id. at 1424. 
 29. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836. 
 30. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1408. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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million.33 The incident became known in the industry as Black 
Monday.34  
The cranberry announcement demonstrated the risks of publicity 
to private parties: it exaggerated the danger to consumers; it used 
excessive language; it failed to limit the scope of the warning; it 
failed to consider the costs to the industry; and it bypassed statutory 
remedies that would have been less damaging and just as swift, such 
as seizing the cranberries or enjoining producers from distributing 
them.35 The episode captured both the variety and severity of the 
risks.  
Contemporary examples show similar patterns. In 2006, after 
receiving reports from the CDC about an outbreak of E. coli related 
to bagged spinach, the FDA issued a series of press releases warning 
consumers.36 Although FDA’s initial announcement identified 
“bagged fresh spinach” as the likely culprit,37 its second press release 
a day later broadened it to “fresh spinach or spinach-containing 
products.”38 The FDA did not narrow its warnings until five days 
later, when it excluded only frozen and canned spinach from the 
warnings.39  
And the FDA was slow to clarify the geographic scope of the 
danger. It took the agency two days after identifying three counties 
in California that may have produced the spinach to clarify that 
consumers could safely eat spinach grown elsewhere.40 Ultimately, 
 
 33. Id. at 1409–10, n.118. 
 34. Id. at 1408. 
 35. Id. at 1409. 
 36. Press Announcements, September 2006–October 2006, FDA PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS, 
http://tinyurl.com/3q3qkav (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (showing eighteen separate press 
releases by the FDA on the E. coli O157:H7 outbreak in September and October 2006). 
 37. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Warning on Serious 
Foodborne E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108731.htm.  
 38. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne 
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 19, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108732.htm.  
 39. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne 
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108740.htm.  
 40. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne 
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm109578.htm; Sara M. Benson, Guidance for 
Improving the Federal Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Fresh Produce, 65 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 509 (2010). 
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the FDA traced the E. coli contamination to spinach produced 
during a single shift, on a single day, at a single farm.41 Although 
such precision could not be expected in the agency’s initial warnings, 
its delay in narrowing the scope of the warning evoked the cranberry 
episode nearly fifty years earlier. Critics also argue that the FDA 
could have traced the source of contamination much sooner, 
narrowed its warnings to certain packaging dates, and reassured 
consumers more quickly that spinach was safe to eat.42  
The episode turned out to be one of the most damaging in the 
nation’s history, both to consumers and to the industry.43 Over 200 
consumers got sick, half of whom required hospitalization, with 
three deaths.44 It cost the industry roughly $350 million, and spinach 
sales have yet to recover.45 
Another contemporary example is the salmonella outbreak in 
2008, which the FDA and CDC incorrectly blamed on tomatoes.46 
The FDA’s press announcements included a steadily-expanding list 
of states from which the agency deemed it was safe to consume 
tomatoes. Eventually, the FDA whittled down its warnings to 
tomatoes produced in Florida and Mexico, and then even further to 
specific areas of Florida and Mexico.47 Nearly six weeks later, the 
FDA identified peppers as the culprit rather than tomatoes, although 
the CDC disagreed.48 The erroneous publicity cost the tomato 
industry roughly $200 million.49  
For these reasons, Gellhorn’s original concerns remain valid 
nearly four decades later: agency publicity is problematic “when it is 
erroneous, misleading or excessive or it serves no authorized agency 
purpose.”50 My review finds that the problems are even broader than 
 
 41. Benson, supra note 40, at 509. 
 42. Id. at 515–16. 
 43. Id. at 509. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 509, 516 (citing Developing A Comprehensive Response to Food Safety Before the 
S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 110th Cong. 57–62 (2007) (statement of 
Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Director, Center for Science in the Public Interest)). 
 46. Id. at 510. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (citing Denis G. Maki, Coming to Grips with Foodborne Infection—Peanut Butter, 
Peppers, and Nationwide Salmonella Outbreaks, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 949 (2009)). 
 50. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839, 
16,839 (June 27, 1973). 
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that. I organize the problems into four categories: (1) the substance 
of announcements can be wrong or misleading; (2) the procedures 
for issuing publicity can be inadequate; (3) the authority to issue 
publicity can be unclear or lacking; and (4) there is often no way to 
redress mistakes or abuses. 
The first problem is with the substance of the publicity itself. 
Agency publicity can mislead or mischaracterize by failing to explain 
the limited scope of the agency’s objections or by failing to clarify 
that the allegations have not fully been adjudicated.51 Publicity can 
be premature, such as when an agency publicizes that it has begun 
investigating a company or filed a complaint, or that a grand jury has 
indicted a company, without simply clarifying that no violations have 
been proven. Publicity can be excessive, such as when an agency uses 
pejorative language, implies broader violations or a history of 
violations not proven, or goes beyond factual reporting.52 And 
publicity can be just plain wrong, such as when an agency relies on 
erroneous information or reports information that turns out to be 
inaccurate.  
The second problem is procedural. When agencies issue 
publicity, they may not give prior notice or any sort of chance to 
plead the company’s case, which is often required by due process or 
by statute when taking more formal actions.53 When agencies make 
rules or adjudicate, they generally have to provide some sort of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.54 But as Gellhorn 
emphasized, “usually no protection other than the common sense 
and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use of 
 
 51. Another problem is that agencies often commission third-party reports and publicize 
their findings without adequately explaining the nature of the study or its limitations. For 
example, the Public Health Service (PHS) aggressively promoted its Cigarette Report to the 
media and failed to correct reasonable misperceptions that the Report was a culmination of 
clinical studies on the safety of cigarettes based on new data, rather than a post-hoc review of 
earlier studies. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384–88.  
 52. Agencies also frequently adorn publicity with quotes from agency prosecutors or 
investigators. See, e.g., News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Kevin Trudeau Banned from 
Infomercials (Sep. 7, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/09/trudeaucoral.shtm.  
 53. In an early example, a federal court held that the FDA did not have to provide a 
prior hearing before issuing adverse publicity condemning a cancer clinic’s therapeutic claims 
and marketing practices. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 377–78 (D.D.C. 
1957). See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1419–20. 
 54. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420; Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5–8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
554–57 (2006). 
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coercive publicity.”55 In disputes with agencies, private parties have 
been unable to convince them to stop disseminating information 
that the party believes is false or misleading.56 As a former FDA 
lawyer cautioned, “there is relatively little a company can do” to stop 
or minimize the damage.57  
The third problem relates to the lack of agency authority. The 
vast majority of agencies do not have explicit statutory authority to 
issue adverse publicity, and thus do so either as a form of 
extrastatutory enforcement, or as a power they derive from the 
interstices of broadly worded enabling statutes.58 Arguably, only the 
FDA, CPSC, and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have 
explicit statutory authority to issue adverse publicity.59 Thus, many 
agencies that do so are accused of exceeding their statutory powers.60 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of agencies can probably justify their 
use of publicity through broadly worded enabling statutes,61 
sometimes treating the statutes as “constitutions” and interpreting 
their broad provisions as a form of “necessary and proper” clause 
 
 55. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420. 
 56. Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (manufacturer of 
veterinary product disputing scientific conclusions about effectiveness of product in article 
published by agency scientists that the USDA widely disseminated). 
 57. Arthur N. Levine, FDA Enforcement: How It Works, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 277 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
 58. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384. 
 59. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b); Consumer 
Product Safety Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b); Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 
297(d) (authorizing the Patent and Trademark Office to publicize complaints against 
invention promoters).  
 60. For example, the Attorney General’s Commission on Administrative Procedures 
alleged that the Federal Alcohol Administration abused its power and exceeded its statutory 
authority by threatening to use adverse publicity. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 135 (1941). Professor 
Gellhorn also noted that the Cost of Living Council’s use of adverse publicity was not 
authorized by statute. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1404–05; Noah, supra note 7, at 890–91. 
Moreover, in virtually every case discussed in Part IV, infra, the aggrieved party alleges that the 
agency exceeded its statutory authority. 
 61. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410–11 (noting, for example, that the FDA, like other 
agencies, “can point to the usual vague grants of authority in its enabling act”); Noah, supra 
note 7, at 890–91. For just one of many examples, the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to 
“collect and disseminate” information on air quality and pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(b)(6) 
(2006). As James Conrad Jr. observes, “These broad authorizations generally are decades old, 
and thus were not enacted at a time when these agencies were consciously using information as 
a means of achieving regulatory goals.” James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act—
Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 529 (2002–03). 
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that enables agencies to carry out their statutory responsibilities.62 
One court even declared that agencies’ enforcement powers “would 
be crippled were these agencies not permitted to use the quick and 
cheap instrument of publicity.”63  
Agencies obviously need to communicate with the public, and it 
would be unwise to weaken their ability to communicate legitimate 
messages that are not intended to punish regulated firms. Moreover, 
agencies have their own First Amendment right to speak, though the 
contours and extent of this right are not yet clear.64 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to categorize publicity as either 
authorized by statute or ultra vires. On one side, most agencies can 
justify their publicity based on expansive delegations of authority to 
disseminate information and notify the public. And on the other 
side, even agencies that have clear statutory authority to issue 
publicity can easily stretch or exceed it.65  
The APA states that agencies may not impose sanctions “except 
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by 
law.”66 But it can be exceedingly difficult to determine when an 
agency is using publicity as a sanction, particularly if the agency has 
multiple motivations.67 As the SEC’s investigation of one recent 
incident reveals, agency personnel consider many priorities when 
issuing adverse publicity, including the desire to deter other 
violations.68 
 
 62. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973). For a rejoinder, see Lars Noah, 
Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1463, 1476–78 (2000). 
 63. See Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 64. Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 65. For a nuanced, thoughtful effort to categorize agencies’ use of adverse publicity and 
other forms of administrative arm-twisting, see Noah, supra note 7, at 896–99. In one case, a 
court found that the CPSC exceeded its statutory authority to publicize product hazards but 
denied a motion to order the agency to retract its earlier press release. United States v. 52,823 
Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK), 1989 WL 140250, at *7–8 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989).  
 66. Administrative Procedure Act § 558(b), 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2006). 
 67. In Trudeau v. FTC, the district court cautioned that private parties should not be 
permitted to “root through the files of a federal agency to determine the motivation of any 
press release . . . .” 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 294 (D.D.C. 2005). In Invention Submission Corp. v. 
Rogan, the PTO seemed to have a long-standing bone to pick with a particular company, but 
was authorized by statute to publicize complaints about the industry and did not identify the 
particular company in the press release. 357 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 68. See generally SEC OIG, supra note 25. 
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This problem is aggravated because Congress generally either 
ignores or acquiesces to agency practices. For example, the D.C. 
Circuit said that Congress had long been aware of the FTC’s 
practices of “issuing news releases and the adverse effects resulting 
therefrom” and had essentially acquiesced to them.69 Congress has 
specifically bounded agency discretion to issue adverse publicity, but 
in only three circumstances.70 And Congress even specifically 
authorized one agency to publicize consumer complaints that had 
not yet been adjudicated,71 seemingly insensitive to the dangers.72  
But courts have noted that the proper venue for challenging 
agency publicity is through the political rather than the judicial 
branch.73 And courts have echoed Gellhorn’s observation that 
potential injuries are “best controlled by internal agency restraint.”74 
Aggrieved parties sometimes seek private bills from Congress asking 
for compensation, but Congress has largely abstained from passing 
such bills. And even when Congress does recommend compensation, 
the Court of Federal Claims rarely grants it.75  
The fourth problem with agency publicity is the lack of redress. 
Courts tend to find that agency publicity is either not reviewable, or 
 
 69. FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). Of course, the idea that congressional silence equals “acquiescence” is not without 
controversy. Two canonical examples are Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) and 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 70. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613; Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2055(b); Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a). The FEC Act 
prohibits the Federal Election Commission from publicizing investigations for fear of adverse 
publicity being premature, unfair, and interfering with campaigns. See Common Cause v. FEC, 
83 F.R.D. 410, 411 (D.D.C. 1979) (citing the legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 437). For 
discussions of the others, see Part IV.B, infra. 
 71. In 1999, Congress enacted the Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999, which required the 
Patent and Trademark Office to publicize complaints filed with the PTO against invention 
promoters. 35 U.S.C. § 297; 37 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2011). Another possible example is that in 
2007, Congress required the FDA to maintain a website to disclose adverse events being 
investigated by the agency for possible labeling revisions. FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-85, § 915, 121 Stat. 823, 958 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 355(r)(2)(D) 
(Supp. I 2007). 
 72. 145 Cong. Rec. S14,521, 29,418–19 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Joseph Lieberman); but see 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (2006). 
 73. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 459–60 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Flue-Cured Tobacco v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4th Cir. 2002); Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n 
v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
 74. E.g., Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1118. 
 75. See Part V.B.1, infra.  
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if it is, not redressable.76 In 1973, ACUS warned that adverse agency 
publicity “is almost never subject to effective judicial review.”77 Not 
much has changed since then. In turn, agencies will be less deterred 
and less likely to check their own discretion.78 
Even when judicial review is available, rarely can it remedy or 
undo the damage.79 Courts cannot unring the bell. The few courts 
that actually found that an agency exceeded its statutory authority 
have searched for ways, such as corrective publicity, to repair the 
damage, but have struggled to find an adequate remedy.80 Some 
agencies, like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), believe that corrective publicity can correct prior errors,81 
despite the long-standing critique of that assumption.82  
Finally, courts are justifiably reluctant to hold agencies 
accountable when an agency has mixed motives for publicizing 
alleged wrongdoing.83 One court went as far as saying that “[t]he 
courts may no more enjoin Government departments from issuing 
statements to the public than they may enjoin a public official from 
making a speech.”84 This problem is particularly important, given the 
recent case law fortifying the government’s free speech rights,85 as 
well as intuitive concerns that agencies should not be chilled by 
congressional oversight or judicial second-guessing when warning 
the public. 
 
 76. See Part V.C.2, infra.  
 77. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839, 
16,839 (June 23, 1973). 
 78. Noah, supra note 7, at 936–37.  
 79. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420. 
 80. United States v. 52,823 Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK), 
1989 WL 140250, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989) (denying a motion to order the CPSC 
to publicly retract its previous press release because it would only further taint the product at 
issue and would confuse consumers).  
 81. For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration stated that 
suppliers whose components are erroneously identified as defective in recall notices can simply 
counter “[a]ny adverse publicity that does erroneously affect a supplier . . . by publicizing the 
correct information when it becomes available.” Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect and 
Noncompliance Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,254, 17,257 (1995). 
 82.  O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849. 
 83. See, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Utah 
1997) (rejecting allegations that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority to make information 
public when in the “public interest”).  
 84. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D.D.C. 1968). 
 85. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
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Thus, adverse publicity presents various risks to private parties, 
many of which have persisted for decades.  
C. Recommendations by Gellhorn and ACUS 
Given the risks, Gellhorn and ACUS recommended that agencies 
publish procedures and articulate standards for issuing adverse 
publicity.86 Congress originally established ACUS to advise the 
President, Congress, and agencies themselves on how to improve the 
fairness and efficiency of federal agencies.87 ACUS published its 
nonbinding recommendations in the Federal Register and codified 
them in the Code of Federal Regulations.88 Gellhorn turned his 
report for ACUS into an article for the Harvard Law Review, which 
became the canonical statement on agency publicity. 
When Gellhorn surveyed federal agencies in the early 1970s, he 
found that although many agencies issued adverse publicity, virtually 
none imposed standards on the practice.89 So he encouraged 
agencies to adopt written standards and publish them, which would 
both force agencies to evaluate their practices and inform regulated 
parties.90  
To this end, Gellhorn and ACUS recommended that agencies 
create policies to help them decide whether to issue publicity in the 
first place.91 Agencies, they argued, should consider whether they are 
specifically authorized to issue publicity, not including general grants 
of authority to make information public.92 They should consider 
whether publicity is necessary, for example, to protect public health 
or prevent substantial economic harm.93 Agencies should consider 
 
 86. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839, 
16,839 (June 27, 1973). 
 87. 5 U.S.C. § 574(1) (2006). Congress declined to renew funding and authorization 
for ACUS in 1995, allowing it to dissolve over bipartisan objections. However, ACUS was 
resurrected with new funding in 2010. 
 88. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839; 1 C.F.R. § 305.73–1 (1974).  
 89. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384–85, 1401 (finding that the EEOC had never 
examined or announced guidelines governing its use of publicity). 
 90. Id. at 1423–24; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 91. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1424. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1425–26; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. For example, 
Gellhorn recommended that the FTC “limit the use of publicity to cases in which it was 
necessary to warn the public about imminent danger,” among other circumstances. Gellhorn, 
supra note 5, at 1427. 
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alternatives that are equally effective but less damaging.94 Gellhorn 
emphasized that publicity “should usually be a sanction of last, not 
first resort.”95 Agencies should be aware of the likelihood and 
severity of the harm that the publicity might cause.96 Agencies 
should consider how accurate and reliable the information 
supporting the publicity is, including the likelihood that it would 
influence the public.97 Finally, agencies should be more circumspect 
when publicizing pending adjudications.98 Publicity about 
investigations or “pending agency trial-type proceedings should issue 
only in limited circumstances. . . .”99 Driving these recommendations 
is the idea that the damage from adverse publicity is hard to 
undoagencies cannot unring the bellso they should carefully 
consider the initial decision to issue publicity. 
If an agency answers this whether question affirmatively, the 
recommendations urged that agency policies also address the content 
of publicity, factoring how complex the issue is, how sophisticated 
the audience is, and whether to reprint pleadings or other 
documents.100 Agency guidelines should instruct personnel to use 
language that is factual and nonpejorative,101 and clarify that 
investigations and complaints are tentative and limited in scope.102  
The recommendations also called for agency policies to specify 
the internal procedures agencies will use, including procedures 
available to the subjects of the publicity. First, policies should make 
clear who within the agency may issue publicity.103 The policies 
should direct media inquiries to a single source and away from 
employees that handle the investigations or litigation.104 Second, 
Gellhorn urged agencies to consider allowing private parties to seek 
 
 94. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426. ACUS urged agencies to use adverse publicity 
“only to the extent necessary to foster agency efficiency, public understanding, or the accuracy 
of news coverage.” Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 95. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426. 
 96. Id. at 1427. 
 97. Id. at 1426; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 98. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1428. 
 99. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 100. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430; id. 
 101. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 102. Id. (“Where information in adverse agency publicity has a limited basis—for 
example, allegations subject to subsequent agency adjudication—that fact should be 
prominently disclosed.”); Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430. 
 103. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430. 
 104. Id. 
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redress within the agency.105 And perhaps most importantly, agencies 
should consider notifying private parties in advance and giving them 
an opportunity to respond before publicity is issued.106 This latter 
provision seems to be the lynchpin: it would have a prophylactic 
effect on restraining agency discretion, and it would satisfy 
procedural concerns. 
The recommendations also addressed courts. Courts should not 
be reluctant to review agency publicity, particularly the threshold 
question of whether an agency has statutory authority.107 If a court 
determines that no such authority to issue publicity exists, it should 
grant injunctions if the private party can show that the injuries are 
not compensable at law.108 Courts should consider whether agencies 
bypassed less burdensome alternatives.109 They should not be 
hesitant to review agency practices and procedures, even though 
these arguably are not “final agency action[s]” under the APA.110 
Finally, courts can use devices to protect the anonymity of the 
private party—such as allowing anonymous complaints, sealing the 
pleadings, and holding in camera hearings—which would prevent 
“the very injury the plaintiff seeks to avoid or have compensated.”111 
Finally, three statutory reforms were addressed to Congress. 
First, Congress should specifically authorize agencies to issue adverse 
publicity, using the Consumer Product Safety Act’s provisions as a 
model.112 The Act requires the CPSC to (i) notify manufacturers 
before publishing damaging information, (ii) give companies a 
reasonable opportunity to respond, and (iii) publish a symmetrical 
retraction of any inaccurate or misleading disclosures.113 If Congress 
cannot do this on an agency-by-agency basis, it should amend the 
APA.114 Second, Congress should authorize direct judicial review to 
determine whether the agency satisfied its own policies and 
 
 105. Id. at 1431. 
 106. Id.; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 107. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1432.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1433. 
 110. Id. at 1434. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 1435.  
 113. Id. (citing Consumer Product Safety Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(b)(1) 
(Supp. 1973)).  
 114. Id. 
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procedures.115 Congress should allow courts to issue orders 
compelling agencies to retract or explain publicity, or change the 
agency’s policies and procedures.116 Finally, Congress should amend 
the Federal Tort Claims Act117 to compensate parties injured by 
adverse agency publicity that was (i) directed at the party, (ii) 
“materially erroneous, substantially misleading, or clearly excessive,” 
and (iii) “not remedied by the final administrative action.”118  
The thrust of these recommendations was to reign in the 
seemingly boundless discretion agencies enjoy. But virtually none of 
these recommendations came to fruition. 
III. WHY THE PROBLEMS ARE AMPLIFIED TODAY 
Despite the call for standards and its subsequent echoes,119 
agency discretion remains virtually unbound. Today, the problems 
are amplified given four interrelated developments—all of which can 
render adverse publicity not only more damaging but also harder to 
remedy. 
A. More Incentives to Use Adverse Publicity 
Since the 1973 ACUS recommendations, agencies have been 
given more incentives to rely on adverse publicity. Much of this 
pertains to the evolutionary arc of modern regulatory agencies, 
which is well-known. Through the twentieth century, Congress 
granted and courts upheld increasingly broad delegations of 
authority to empower agencies to respond to problems of greater 
scope and complexity. The legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches tried to counterbalance this shift of power by imposing 
various checks and balances on agencies, which progressively 
“ossified” agency practices.120 Agencies with finite resources and 
expanding responsibilities responded by developing an arsenal of 
informal tools not specifically authorized by statute and not subject 
to judicial review.121 Thus, the traditional focus of administrative law 
 
 115. Id. at 1436.  
 116. Id. 
 117. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401–02, 2411–12, 2671–80 
(2006). 
 118. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1437–39. 
 119. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 7; Morey, supra note 7; Noah, supra note 7. 
 120. Noah, supra note 7, at 875. 
 121.  Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1392 
scholarship on rulemaking and adjudication “represent[s] only a 
small fraction of agency activity” today.122 Adverse publicity is a 
perfect example of what Lars Noah calls extrastatutory “arm-
twisting.”123  
From federal agencies’ perspective, this is perfectly 
understandable. Agencies often struggle to carry out their statutory 
mandates, often due to some combination of insufficient funding, 
watered-down statutory authority, formal and informal oversight by 
the political branches, and industry pressures. Agencies cannot 
enforce all regulations at all times. Moreover, the refrain that 
agencies are hostile to regulated industries tends to be overblown. 
Agencies frequently try to cooperate with and accommodate industry 
interests, which triggers criticisms that agencies are too industry-
friendly. Agencies rightly feel they are in a Catch-22. Either way, 
modern regulatory agencies often find that adverse publicity is much 
more convenient than using more traditional regulatory tools. 
B. More Ways to Issue Adverse Publicity 
The second major evolution resides less with agencies and more 
with the platforms now available to them. Today, every federal 
agency has a website, and through these websites agencies can 
publish a staggering amount of freestanding information about 
companies that is not disclosed as part of rulemaking.124 A number of 
catalysts encouraged this. The 1996 Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) Amendments required federal agencies to 
establish electronic reading rooms that make important documents 
available to the public, including those documents likely to be 
requested via FOIA.125 The 2002 E-Government Act requires 
agencies to make rulemaking accessible electronically by soliciting 
and accepting comments online.126 More recently, the Obama 
 
 122. Id. at 874. 
 123. Id. Professor Noah defines “arm-twisting” as “a threat by an agency to impose a 
sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a request 
that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated entity.” This definition encompasses, 
and Professor Noah thus addresses, adverse publicity. Id. 
 124. Conrad, supra note 61, at 526. 
 125. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
231, 110 Stat. 3048 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
 126. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915–16 
(2002). 
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administration has emphasized transparency in the federal 
government.127 
But even without these initiatives, most agencies have realized 
that websites are an efficient way to communicate. In fact, press 
releases and other forms of publicity may represent a small fraction of 
the information that an agency makes public about a private party.128 
Most agencies publish enforcement actions, including preliminary 
investigations and warnings.129 Agencies also post comments 
submitted during rulemaking, company reports, license applications, 
and copious amounts of other information about firms.  
Agencies also use modern media, sometimes as a response to 
how regulated firms use it. For example, the FDA used adverse 
publicity to respond to a company that had issued its own publicity, 
in part to reach the same audience.130 The PTO used its own 
advertising campaign to counter deceptive advertising by an 
invention submission marketer.131 Our intuition might be to let 
agencies fight fire with fire. After all, companies subject to adverse 
agency publicity often issue their own publicity simultaneously as a 
counter.132 Today, these publicity wars use more sophisticated 
weaponry than in 1973. 
Federal agencies have also embraced new media, such as 
podcasts, RSS feeds, and even Twitter feeds.133 For example, of the 
 
 127. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 128. For an account of how private parties can address inaccurate or misleading 
information about them on agency websites, see O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra 
note 7, at 507. 
 129. See, e.g., EPA, Enforcement and Compliance History Online, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/echo (last updated Sept. 7, 2011); FDA, Criminal Investigations, 
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/default.htm (last updated 
Sept. 12, 2011); OSHA, Establishment Search, OSHA.GOV, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/ 
establishment.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); SEC, Litigation, SEC.GOV 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml (last modified Dec. 20, 2011). 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
 131. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
the PTO’s press release that the agency was “unveil[ing] a television and radio campaign in five 
media markets to counter the flood of deceptive advertising aimed at America’s independent 
inventors” (citation omitted)). 
 132. Banfi Products issued its own press release on the same day that the ATF issued a 
press release announcing that wine imported by the company was likely contaminated. Banfi 
Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 119 (Fed. Cl. 1997). 
 133. For example, the FDA publishes four separate podcasts and eighteen separate RSS 
feeds. See FDA, Subscribe to Podcasts and News Feeds, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/ContactFDA/StayInformed/RSSFeeds/default.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 
2011).  
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five agencies I address (the CPSC, EPA, FDA, FTC, and SEC), all 
but the FTC maintain a Twitter feed, often with thousands of 
subscribers or “followers,” several of which are news media 
organizations. Agencies do not use Twitter to announce what they 
had for lunch. The CPSC routinely announces product recalls on 
Twitter.134 The EPA maintains 18 separate Twitter feeds, including 
“EPA News” and a feed for EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson.135 The 
FDA has several Twitter feeds dedicated to drugs, devices, tobacco, 
and recalls generally.136 The SEC announces enforcement actions 
under its “SEC News” Twitter feed.137 In July 2010, it “tweeted” 
that Goldman Sachs had agreed to pay $550 million to settle SEC 
charges, with a link to the agency’s press release.138  
New media allow agencies to communicate with audiences more 
quickly and more casually than ever. These media utilize truncated, 
blurb-inducing formats to encourage wide disseminationTwitter, 
for example, is famous for limiting posts to 140 characters. Thus, 
agency announcements via new media are even more distilled and 
have less room to explain the nuance of complex regulatory actions 
than traditional press releases. This is a considerable departure from 
1973, and one that agencies should consider when creating internal 
guidelines. 
 
 134. See OnSafety, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/OnSafety (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
As of September 12, 2011, more than 11,000 people were following this Twitter feed. 
 135. See EPAnews, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/EPAnews (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); 
lisapjackson, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/lisapjackson (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). As of 
September 12, 2011, the EPA News feed had over 14,000 followers and the Lisa Jackson feed 
at over 23,000 followers. 
 136. See FDADeviceInfo, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDADeviceInfo (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2011); FDA_Drug_Info, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDA_Drug_Info (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2011); FDArecalls, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/FDArecalls (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2011); and FDATobacco, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDATobacco (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2011). Together, these FDA Twitter feeds had roughly 252,000 subscribers 
or followers as of September 12, 2011, with FDArecalls alone boasting nearly 200,000 
followers. 
 137. See SEC_News, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/SEC_News?source=onebox (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2011). The SEC also has Twitter feeds for investor education 
(http://twitter.com/SEC_Investor_Ed), which includes announcements of enforcement 
actions.  
 138. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC 
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.  
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C. More Opportunities to Misinterpret Publicity 
New media also make it more likely that audiences will misread, 
misunderstand, or mischaracterize the announcement. Readers can 
forward, repost, link to, and retweet agency announcements with 
very little effort. Readers can even create their own pages or news 
feeds that essentially make agency announcements for them. For 
example, Facebook users created a page for the Food and Drug 
Administration, which allows other users to link to FDA 
announcements and post other information that casual readers could 
easily attribute to the agency itself.139 Sometimes it can be difficult to 
determine if the agency is authoring the content or not.140 For 
example, some Twitter feeds include agency names in the title (e.g., 
“FDAWarning”), but appear to be published by nonagency sources, 
increasing the risk that readers will be confused.141  
Even if one focuses solely on traditional publicity rather than on 
new media or social media, this publicity now comes in multiple 
formats. For example, in one case the CPSC had issued statements 
about a product in an official agency news publication, a “Technical 
Fact Sheet,” and in a traditional press release.142 The FDA alone uses 
dozens of forms of publicity, as I catalog below.143 Some formats 
have legal or regulatory significance—for example, FDA “recall” 
announcements are different from “market withdrawal” 
announcements—but many do not. And most audiences generally 
do not appreciate these distinctions anyway.  
The media can also turn an agency press release that is relatively 
innocuous into something more damaging. For example, after the 
PTO issued a press release announcing its new media campaign to 
warn the public about invention submission promoters—quoting 
one inventor who lost money dealing with an unnamed company—a 
journalist contacted the inventor quoted and published stories that 
 
 139. See Food and Drug Administration, FACEBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/3vdunmt (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2011).  
 140. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, FACEBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/ 
3qhbde3 (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 141. FDAWarning, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDAWarning (last visited Sept. 12, 
2011). Note, however, that Twitter does indicate that certain Twitter feeds are “Verified 
Accounts.”  
 142. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1050–51 (D. Del. 
1976). 
 143. See infra Part IV.A.  
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identified the company.144 Despite the PTO’s long-standing 
skepticism of this company, it had not identified the company in its 
press release.145 But once the information became public, the agency 
lost the ability to control it. Today, investigative bloggers and other 
online news sources can easily dig up this information. 
D. Hyper-Responsive Capital Markets 
The fourth major change since 1973 is that capital markets and 
other audiences now process agency publicity swiftly and sometimes 
hastily, raising the stakes for companies and decreasing the margin 
for error. Stock prices quickly reflect new information—whether the 
information is inaccurate, misleading, or simply misinterpreted. 
The most noteworthy recent example of capital markets over-
responding to bad information happened in 2008, when United 
Airlines stock lost 76% of its value—roughly $1 billion—in just over 
thirty minutes of trading. Bloomberg financial news mistakenly 
republished a six-year-old story announcing that United would file 
for bankruptcy.146 Bloomberg relied on third-party content providers 
to find the latest news on companies, and one mistakenly reposted 
the 2002 article after searching for 2008 articles on United using 
Google’s search engine.147 Although Bloomberg posted a correction 
just fifteen minutes later, and though United’s stock mostly 
recovered,148 the incident showed that “the market apparently reacts 
to a headline as much as anything else.”149 Capital markets today are 
swift, decisive, and jittery. Moreover, it is doubtful that companies or 
their investors could recover legal damages for an incident like 
this.150 Aware of this problem, the regulatory branch of the New 
 
 144. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 455, 459 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 145. Id. at 456. But see Tozzi v. HHS, 271 F.3d 301, 307–10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding 
that manufacturer had standing to challenge an HHS report classifying a chemical as a 
carcinogen because manufacturer could demonstrate actual and immediate injury-in-fact that 
was fairly traceable to the agency’s report). 
 146. Frank Ahrens, 2002’s News, Yesterday’s Sell-Off, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at A1.  
 147. Id.  
 148. NASDAQ halted trading on United’s stock after the 76% drop. After trading 
reopened that day, United stock largely rebounded, though it ended the day 11.2% below the 
previous day’s close and continued to trade lower several days after the incident. See CARLOS 
CARVALHO, NICHOLAS KLAGGE, & EMANUEL MOENCH, THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF A 
FALSE NEWS SHOCK: FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 374, at 1 (revised 
June 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408169.  
 149. Ahrens, supra note 146, at A1. 
 150. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 states that “[N]o provider or user of an 
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York Stock Exchange (NYSE) asked the SEC to give it advanced 
notice of major enforcement announcements, or make such 
announcements during non-trading hours, but the SEC denied this 
request.151 
Of course, we have long known that adverse agency publicity can 
decimate stock prices. The United incident merely demonstrates that 
mistakes can be amplified with today’s hyper-responsive capital 
markets. Under the “efficient market hypothesis” (EMH), securities 
prices rapidly reflect available information without bias.152 Early 
studies testing this hypothesis “demonstrate[d] that the capital 
market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of 
information.”153 This response is quick enough that investors 
possessing new information usually cannot really profit from it.154 
Although EMH has long been the subject of an increasingly 
sophisticated theoretical and empirical debate among legal and 
 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” Pub. L. No. 104–104, tit. I, § 509, 110 
Stat. 137 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006)). Moreover, mere negligence would not 
sustain a libel claim; the plaintiff must prove malicious intent. For another contemporary 
example of hypersensitive investors, focusing on different legal issues, see Matrixx Initiatives 
Inc. v. Siracuso, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1315–16 (2011), in which a drug company’s shares fell over 
11% after a news report that the FDA was investigating adverse reactions from a common cold 
medicine, then almost completely recovered after the company posted its press release that 
(fraudulently) assured that its drug did not cause the adverse reactions. Moreover, Matrixx was 
sued in consumer class action suits just days after the FDA published its original warning letter 
to Matrixx on its website. See Sarah Taylor Roller, Raqiyyah R. Pippins, & Jennifer W. Ngai, 
FDA’s Expanding Postmarket Authority to Monitor and Publicize Food and Consumer Health 
Product Risks: The Need for Procedural Safeguards to Reduce “Transparency” Policy Harms in 
the Post-9/11 Regulatory Environment, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 577, 592 n.63 (2009). 
 151. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 65–71. The SEC declined NYSE’s request because it 
was concerned about leaks and believed that announcements that have a big trading impact 
would be sufficiently rare. 
 152. There are “strong,” “semi-strong,” and “weak” forms of this hypothesis. See Ian 
Ayers & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 318 n.18 
(2002). In the strong form, the securities price reflects all information, including both public 
and nonpublic. Id. Under the semi-strong form, the price reflects only public information. Id. 
And under the weak form, it reflects only prior price information. Id. Empirical reviews tend to 
support the weak or semi-strong variants. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the 
Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911–12 n.11 (1989). 
Eugene Fama first developed these variants. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review 
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 153. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984).  
 154. Id. at 555 (“‘[A]vailable information’ does not support profitable trading strategies 
or arbitrage opportunities.”). 
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financial scholars,155 most generally accept that stock prices fluctuate 
in response to specific events. Indeed, “event studies” can use 
econometrics to measure how stock prices respond after certain 
events, “usually announcements of various corporate, legal, or 
regulatory action or proposed action.”156 Event studies of regulation 
tend to focus on the banking and financial industries, and on the 
announcement of new regulations rather than announcements of 
enforcement actions.157 But economists have been conducting event 
studies for years,158 and event studies tied to particular regulatory 
enforcement announcements could be used to appraise the 
immediate effects of adverse publicity. 
Beyond the immediate market reaction, the Internet acts as a 
multiplier to adverse publicity,159 and the effects can linger. Word 
can spread via online news aggregators, blogs, message boards, chat 
rooms, and social media. These media and the twenty-four hour 
news cycle propagate news bites that lack the nuance to convey the 
nature of regulatory actions. Thus, agency statements can be 
multiplied “without a corresponding right or remedy for those who 
disagree with the agency.”160 Companies are rightly terrified that 
their legal and regulatory violations—real or alleged—will be 
broadcast.161 Although this may be the cost of doing business in a 
regulated industry, agencies should not completely disregard these 
concerns. 
E. Counterforces? 
Two counterforces might limit the risks that agencies will issue 
adverse publicity that is erroneous, excessive, or misinterpreted. First, 
 
 155. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002), for an overview 
of the debate. 
 156. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and 
Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 144 (2002). 
 157. See Sanjai Bhagat & Robert Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical 
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 410–14 (2002). 
 158. John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND 
J. ECON. 167, 167–68 (1985); G. William Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of 
Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 121, 122–24, 149–50 (1981). 
 159. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity: An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45 
DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 343 (1996). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
1371 Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies 
 1399 
agencies seem to be aware that they can saturate the public with 
warnings and announcements. Back in 1973, Gellhorn noted that 
consumers were relatively indifferent to warnings by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) due to “notice 
saturation,” given the frequent warnings relating to “almost every 
make and model of automobile.”162 Today, agencies like the EPA, 
FDA, FTC, and CPSC issue so many warnings that the public may 
have developed some immunity to them, ironically rendering each 
announcement less newsworthy. Frequent warnings by the NHTSA 
“may have dissipated rather than heightened public interest.”163 The 
FTC’s frequent notices similarly fell on numbed ears.164  
Other agencies recognize the danger of notice saturation in 
theory,165 though they continue to inundate the public. As noted in 
my review of FDA publicity between 2004 and 2010, infra, the 
FDA issued, on average, one new press release almost every business 
day over a seven-year period.166 Agency announcements even 
compete with each other for attention, and agencies sometimes 
schedule big announcements on different days to maximize their 
reach.167 Agencies like the FDA will publish multiple press releases 
about important recalls—often with daily updates and titles that 
declare their urgency—in order to distinguish them from run-of-the-
mill announcements.168 Thus, although agencies seem to be aware of 
notice saturation, it is not clear that it serves as a meaningful 
restraint. Moreover, although the general public can be easily 
saturated by notices, industry followers and the investing community 
seem to pay attention to the large volume of agency announcements. 
 
 162. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418. 
 163. Id. (noting, however, that FDA warnings tended to be less frequent and involved 
scientific matter that the public was less likely to challenge). 
 164. Id. at 1427. 
 165. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (Mar. 4, 1977) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“[A]n excess of negative information could make the 
public indifferent or insensitive to important warnings . . . .”); Wayne L. Pines, Regulatory 
Letters, Publicity & Recalls, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 352, 354 (1976) (“We know what 
happened to the boy who cried ‘adulterated’ too often. He got himself and his message 
‘adulterated.’”).  
 166. See infra Part IV.A.  
 167. See, e.g., SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 53. 
 168. For example, the FDA published eighteen separate press releases to publicize the 
2006 E. coli outbreak. Press Announcements, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/default.htm?Page=2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1400 
The second potential counterforce is that agencies now give 
more careful scrutiny to the accuracy of information they publish and 
the fairness of publishing it. As agencies began to release more 
information to the public—both passively, as when responding to 
FOIA requests and posting information on websites, and more 
actively, by affirmatively issuing press releases169—concerns grew that 
agencies were releasing information that was inaccurate or based on 
less-than-perfect data.  
So in 2001, Congress required agencies to ensure the “quality, 
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information” that they 
disseminate.170 The law required the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to publish guidelines to ensure that information 
released met minimum standards for accuracy and objectivity and to 
create procedures that allowed parties to correct information if the 
agency did not.171 However, after the OMB’s Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) proposed such guidelines, it explicitly 
excluded agency press releases, as well as charges made by agencies 
during adjudications.172 Although OIRA’s guidelines create a very 
large exception, Professor James T. O’Reilly suggests that they might 
make agency personnel more circumspect when issuing adverse 
publicity, or maybe even require agencies to retract inaccurate or 
misleading statements.173  
Despite these developments, adverse publicity generally has 
become even more coercive. As O’Reilly observes, “the forceful 
assertion of agency condemnation may achieve more in a day than an 
adjudicative proceeding could produce in many months of effort.”174 
 
 169. Professor O’Reilly distinguishes active versus passive publicity, noting the distinction 
between an agency affirmatively publishing a press release and hosting a press conference and 
“passively” posting information on its website. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra 
note 7, at 516–17. 
 170. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 
Stat. 2763 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(d)(1), 3516 (2006)). Around the same time, the 
American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted a recommendation that agencies 
establish and publicize a process for correcting factual errors in information disseminated by 
agencies. HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2001 ANNUAL MEETING, DAILY J. AM. BAR ASS’N, Report 
No. 107c, at 7–11 (Aug. 6–7, 2001) (on file with author).  
 171. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 § 515. 
 172. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 371 (Jan. 3, 
2002). 
 173. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 845, 849. 
 174. Id. at 837. 
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We have long recognized that companies fear adverse publicity as 
much as, if not more than, formal sanctions.175 And in the modern 
era, when the Internet serves as a content multiplier, and when 
capital markets seize information without verifying the details, the 
velocity and severity of the fallout can be even greater.176 For these 
reasons, the 1973 recommendations cannot be completely 
superimposed today, and must be adapted to account for 
technological developments. 
IV. THE AFTERMATH: AGENCIES AND DISPUTES SINCE 1973 
This Part evaluates what agencies did in response to the ACUS 
recommendations—virtually nothing—and considers how agencies 
have exercised their discretion and defended themselves in litigation, 
examining twenty-six federal court opinions since 1973 that 
challenged adverse agency publicity. I begin with an in-depth case 
study of the FDA, and then briefly examine other agencies, including 
the FTC, EPA, SEC, and CPSC. These agencies offer variations on 
the FDA’s story, but confirm our generalized concerns. In short, 
Congress should improve agencies’ statutory enforcement authority 
so that the agency does not have to rely on publicity.  
A. Case Study: The Food and Drug Administration 
The FDA responded more than other agencies to the ACUS 
recommendations. In 1977, the FDA proposed a rule on its use of 
adverse publicity, attempting to codify and update its existing 
policies.177 In the preamble to the proposal, the FDA acknowledged 
that adverse publicity can interfere with criminal and civil actions and 
“cause economic harm to both individuals and firms.”178 Of course, 
the FDA had every reason to acknowledge these dangers after 
causing the 1959 cranberry scare and other incidents. 
The FDA’s proposed rule would have set publicity standards and 
procedures that varied according to the nature of the FDA’s action, 
delineating between criminal trials, civil litigation, investigations, and 
 
 175. Curcio, supra note 161, at 370; FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 249. 
 176. Curcio, supra note 161, at 370. 
 177. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440–41 
(Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 178. Id. at 12,436.  
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administrative hearings.179 The rule would have provided advance 
notice to the parties identified and would have allowed parties to 
request that the FDA correct or retract its statements.180 Although 
the thrust of the FDA’s proposal was to restrain itself, it emphasized 
that it would reserve broad discretion to go beyond these self-
imposed limits when necessary.181 Indeed, the preamble reads like 
one long justification for issuing adverse publicity.182 The FDA even 
stated that it would knowingly jeopardize a criminal action with 
pretrial publicity if “needed to protect the public.”183  
Ultimately, the FDA never finalized the proposed rule and 
withdrew the rule fourteen years later without much explanation.184 
In 1976, the FDA’s parent agency adopted publicity regulations,185 
and the FDA generally follows this policy today.186  
But despite being the only federal agency to formally respond to 
the ACUS recommendations, the FDA continues to use adverse 
publicity in ways that contravene those recommendations. The FDA 
continues to rely on adverse publicity (or simply the threat thereof) 
as a regulatory weapon.187 The FDA asserts the same justifications for 
issuing adverse publicity that it articulated in its 1977 proposed rule, 
as evidenced by its arguments in litigation.188 Like other agencies, 
the FDA uses publicity for a number of purposes: to warn the public, 
to notify the public of agency activities, and to clarify the agency’s 
views and policies.189  
 
 179. Id. at 12,440–41. 
 180. Id. at 12,441. 
 181. Id. at 12,436–41. 
 182. The FDA’s proposal even defined “publicity” very narrowly as press releases, press 
conferences, and media interviews intended to invite public attention. Id. at 12,440. Of 
course, today FDA uses several additional vehicles for publicity. 
 183. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,438. 
 184. Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440, 67,446 
(Dec. 30, 1991). 
 185. Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 2, 1976) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 186. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 22:41 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 187. Noah, supra note 7, at 890. 
 188.  See, e.g., Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 124–26 (Fed. Cl. 
1997); Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286–87 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 189. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,436 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). Although the FDA stated these purposes in a 
proposed rule that was later withdrawn, these purposes generally reflect the agency’s approach. 
FDA, RESEARCHING FDA WITH PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES, http://tinyurl.com/4yr97c3 
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The FDA is understandably protective of its duty to warn the 
public of dangerous products and other health risks. In cases 
challenging FDA publicity, the agency routinely emphasizes that it 
must warn the public of health risks, even when acting on limited 
information and scientific uncertainty.190 The FDA has long had to 
warn the public in the face of such uncertainty. In 1971, the FDA 
Commissioner Charles C. Edwards defended the agency’s decision 
to warn the public before reaching a definitive conclusion that a 
product in fact caused death or serious injury: “In dealing with life 
or death problems like botulism, there are times when the public 
interest demands action before the scientific case is complete. The 
decision always must be made in favor of consumer protection.”191  
Other FDA reporting and disclosure programs take a similar 
stancerequiring disclosure of events before establishing causation 
with scientific certainty, for example.192 Indeed, modern regulatory 
agencies of all kinds must routinely operate amid scientific 
uncertainty.193  
As with adverse publicity by other agencies, FDA press releases 
are generally reported by the trade press, the investment media,194 
and often the national media. FDA publicity can be particularly 
damaging partly because consumers traditionally have a very low 
tolerance for perceived risks to the safety of food and drugs.195 
It is difficult to locate every instance in which adverse publicity 
by the FDA tangibly harmed the parties identified. Apart from legal 
challenges that generate judicial opinions, few publications report 
the aftermath. There are even fewer reported incidents affecting 
 
(last updated May 5, 2009) (“The agency’s press releases and talk papers present FDA’s 
viewpoints and policies on a wide variety of issues . . . .”). 
 190. See, e.g., Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 124–26; Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286–87. 
 191. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1415 n.142 (quoting HEW Release No. 71-67 (Nov. 1, 
1971)). 
 192. For example, companies must report to the FDA adverse events “associated” with 
their products even before the company may know for sure that its product caused the adverse 
event. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2011). 
 193. In a well-known contemporary example, the EPA claimed that it could not propose 
regulations governing greenhouse gas emitting substances like carbon dioxide because it could 
not conclude definitively that carbon dioxide qualifies as an air pollutant. Control of Emissions 
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930–31 (Sep. 8, 2003). 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 
(2007). 
 194. Levine, supra note 57, at 278. 
 195. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410. 
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individual firms, but some stand out. For example, one day after the 
FDA publicized manufacturing violations at a medical device plant, 
the company’s stock lost 35% of its value, and the company 
subsequently suspended manufacturing and laid off 350 
employees.196 In another incident, the FDA’s alert about a medical 
device caused a national retail pharmacy chain to immediately 
remove it from its stores.197  
More recently, in March 2003, the FDA issued a public “Talk 
Paper” to publicize its objections to a press release issued by the 
drug company SuperGen that discussed its cancer drug 
Mitozytrex.198 The FDA criticized SuperGen for exaggerating the 
drug’s safety and effectiveness, and for minimizing its risks.199 The 
FDA called SuperGen’s statements “misleading,” “demonstrably 
false,” and “particularly egregious.”200 The company’s stock price fell 
nearly 25% within hours.201 
The FDA reportedly did not notify SuperGen of its objections 
beforehand.202 Agency officials subsequently referred to the 
SuperGen Talk Paper as a novel approach to “stop misleading 
promotion.”203 But the FDA seemed to struggle internally with the 
decision to publish it. The SuperGen Talk Paper was the first time in 
17 years that the FDA voiced its objection through its own publicity 
rather than through a more traditional Warning Letter.204 And the 
FDA did not publish the Talk Paper until four months after 
SuperGen issued its press release.205 As my coauthors and I noted in 
 
 196. James G. Dickinson, Publicity as Punishment, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC 
INDUSTRY 24 (Jan. 1992); O’REILLY, supra note 186 at § 22.42. 
 197. FDA QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 1987, at 20 (1987); O’REILLY, supra 
note 186, at § 22.42.  
 198. FDA, supra note 1. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. FDA Responds in Kind to SuperGen, supra note 3, at 6; Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 
649. 
 202. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. 
 203. DDMAC Looking for More “Creative” Enforcement Actions, FDAWEBVIEW (June 
18, 2003), http://www.fdaweb.com (quoting DDMAC Director Tom Abrams) (last accessed 
Sept. 12, 2011). 
 204. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. Traditionally, Talk Papers were ostensibly aimed 
at FDA personnel, while Warning Letters were notifications to specific private parties notifying 
them that the agency believes the party is violating the FDCA. FDA, REGULATORY 
PROCEDURES MANUAL at Exhibit 4-1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM176965.pdf.  
 205. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. Moreover, the FDA later republished the Talk 
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a prior article,206 the FDA used the Talk Paper to reach the same 
audience as SuperGen’s press release and to avoid giving SuperGen 
procedural rights associated with formal enforcement actions. It is 
not clear why the FDA did not notify SuperGen of its objections 
beforehand, particularly because four months had passed and there 
did not appear to be a health emergency or a risk of significant 
economic loss that might justify it. The Talk Paper would have 
violated the FDA’s proposed 1977 rule in several ways, although in 
the agency’s defense “Talk Papers” would not be covered under the 
rule’s definition of “publicity.”207 Nevertheless, the SuperGen Talk 
Paper illustrates how easily agencies can name and shame companies. 
Of course, the FDA has more explicit statutory authority to issue 
publicity than most other agencies.208 Section 705 of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) allows the FDA to publish 
“judgments, decrees, and court orders” enforcing the Act, including 
the nature and disposition of the action.209 But § 705 also bestows 
broader authority on the FDA to disseminate information about 
regulated products that involve an “imminent danger to health or 
gross deception of the consumer.”210 This latter provision clarifies 
that nothing prohibits the FDA from publishing the results of 
investigations.211 Notably, this language seems to bless the FDA 
practice of announcing fully adjudicated actions, rather than 
preliminary actions, unless there is imminent danger. 
The FDA has long interpreted § 705 as granting it explicit 
authority to issue adverse publicity212—a reasonable assertion given 
the statute’s plain language.213 But the FDA has also asserted that it 
has implicit authority to issue publicity because the Public Health 
 
Paper, removing a disclaimer on the original Talk Paper that noted that the agency uses Talk 
Papers to guide agency personnel but uses press releases to inform the general public. Id. at 
649 n.138. Apparently, the FDA was aware that it was using the Talk Paper more like a press 
release. 
 206. Id. at 648–50. 
 207. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (March 4, 
1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).  
 208. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1408. 
 209. FDCA § 705(a), 21 U.S.C. § 375(a) (2006). 
 210. FDCA § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b). 
 211. Id. 
 212. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437. 
 213. Some also argue that the 1990 Safe Medical Devices Act enhanced FDA’s statutory 
authority to issue publicity by granting the FDA additional authority to warn about device 
hazards. O’REILLY, supra note 186, at § 22.41 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(2)(B)).  
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Service Act requires the agency to make public information about 
the products that it regulates.214 Finally, the FDA has justified its 
discretionary authority to issue publicity under the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Barr v. Matteo, which “recognized that Federal agencies 
have implicit authority to issue public statements respecting agency 
policy on matters of wide public interest.”215  
Thus, Congress clearly has granted the FDA discretion to issue 
adverse publicity. The question is whether FDA abuses its discretion. 
The FDA has long viewed its statutory powers expansively. When 
Peter Barton Hutt was Chief Counsel for the agency, he declared 
that the FDCA “must be regarded as a constitution” that gives the 
FDA broad discretion to protect the public health as necessary.216 
And in subsequent legal challenges to FDA publicity, the agency 
argued that it had almost unreviewable discretion to warn the 
public.217 Of course, scholars and courts have long been suspicious of 
such claims.218 The FDA enjoys several other statutory enforcement 
powers, such as the power to seize products and obtain 
injunctions,219 but these powers “depend on court approval and are 
costly to administer, time-consuming, and . . . often ineffective.”220 
Thus, the FDA sometimes relies on the threat of adverse publicity to 
encourage parties to comply with its demands.  
Today, the FDA uses nonbinding guidance documents and 
employee manuals to address its use of publicity. Its Regulatory 
Procedures Manual states that the FDA Office of Public Affairs is 
responsible for preparing and approving press releases and Talk 
Papers.221 The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) publishes a Manual of Policies and Procedures that 
articulates policies for issuing press releases, Talk Papers, and other 
 
 214. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437 (citing Public 
Health Service Act §§ 301, 310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242o). 
 215. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437 (citing Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)). 
 216. Hutt, supra note 62, at 178. 
 217.  See infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 218. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 7, at 911–12; Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could 
(Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 
(2008). 
 219. FDCA §§ 302, 304, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334. 
 220. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1407. 
 221. REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204, at § 8-8 (2010). 
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forms of publicity,222 describing in detail procedures for drafting and 
clearing these documents. It even specifies procedures for resolving 
disputes within the agency that might arise when approving 
publicity, but does not mention any procedures available to parties 
outside the agency.223 In fact, the Manual addresses virtually none of 
the recommendations urged by Gellhorn and ACUS, and does not 
even seem to incorporate FDA’s proposed rule from 1977.224 
In the preamble to its 1977 proposed rule, the FDA stated that 
press releases “ordinarily are personally approved by the Assistant 
Commissioner for Public Affairs and the Commissioner.”225 But the 
proposed rule included no definite procedures for approving and 
releasing publicity.226 Today, press releases require a relatively low 
level of clearance within the FDA compared to other forms of 
publicity, and are disseminated by public relations personnel and on 
FDA’s website.227  
The FDA’s 1977 proposal also stated that private parties could 
file a citizen petition asking the Assistant Commissioner for Public 
Affairs to retract or correct publicity, and included procedures for 
expediting requests.228 Today, parties can still file citizen petitions 
with the agency under separate regulations,229 but the FDA specifies 
no separate procedures for parties to object to publicity. Citizen 
petitions may not receive timely responses, and the FDA does not 
describe any expedited procedures.  
The FDA sometimes does not notify the private party or give it 
an opportunity to respond to adverse publicity, although the agency 
 
 222. CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (MAPP) 4112.1, CDER/FDA 
PRESS OFFICE INTERACTIONS IN THE PREPARATION AND CLEARANCE OF WRITTEN 
DOCUMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm073021.pdf. 
 223. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 3–6. 
 224. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,436 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 225. Id. at 12,437. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Although press releases are issued by departments within FDA’s five centers, Talk 
Papers are issued at the agency level, and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) are issued by the 
FDA’s centers. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2.  
 228. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,441 (to be codified 
21 C.F.R. pt. 2.746). 
 229. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 10.30 (2011). 
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believes that targeted parties are often aware that they are on the 
agency’s radar.230  
The FDA is often willing to notify parties beforehand, but only 
in general terms stating that the agency will be issuing publicity; the 
agency “does not negotiate with the company about the text of the 
FDA announcement,” “[n]or will FDA share the text of a press 
communication with a company in advance,”231 on the grounds that 
doing so “would be inconsistent with the principle of equal access to 
public information” under FOIA.232 Sometimes, advance notice gives 
the party an opportunity to issue its own publicity in response; other 
times, the FDA believes advance notice would be inappropriate, such 
as when it initiates an enforcement action.233 
Although the FDA does not routinely publicize the enforcement 
actions it initiates—such as issuing a Warning Letter or even signing 
a consent decree234—it does announce a significant number of these 
actions in press releases, and posts virtually all of them on its website. 
The FDA also recognizes that a press release can be more effective 
than formal enforcement in some cases, and is more likely to 
publicize “an enforcement action against a large multinational 
corporation” or one involving “a well-recognized product or 
brand.”235  
The FDA has defended its discretion to publicly disclose 
enforcement actions already taken,236 and frequently issues press 
releases announcing consent decrees, settlements, judgments, and 
criminal sentences. But the FDA also regularly issues press releases 
announcing preliminary matters like investigations, civil complaints, 
and criminal charges, and indictments. Sometimes, the FDA will 
update previously issued announcements stating that a court has 
entered a consent decree of permanent injunction. But I did not find 
any updates announcing decisions favorable to defendants.237 
 
 230. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439. 
 231. Levine, supra note 57, at 277. 
 232. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Levine, supra note 57, at 277. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects; Standards for Institutional Review Boards 
for Clinical Investigations, 46 Fed. Reg. 8958, 8974 (Jan. 27, 1981) (rejecting a public 
comment stating that publicly disclosing FDA disqualifications of Institutional Review Boards 
would make it difficult for the IRB to recruit). 
 237. Note that in a bizarre press release, the FDA stated that it had posted a Warning 
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In general, FDA press releases sound less threatening than 
Warning Letters, in which the FDA typically alleges that a company 
has violated the statute, regulations, or both, and asks the company 
to take immediate remedial action or face a formal enforcement 
action.238 Moreover, in the past, the FDA’s Warning Letters stated 
that it would recommend to other federal agencies not to award 
contracts for affected products.239 Although press releases did not 
contain similar threats, both types of documents can constitute a 
form of punishment against companies that the FDA suspects are 
violating its regulations. 
I surveyed the FDA’s website to determine how frequently the 
agency issues publicity and in what forms. My review found that the 
FDA uses a large number of forms and formats for publicity. In 
addition to traditional press releases, the FDA also uses television 
and radio appearances, speeches at conferences, and even 
congressional testimony.240 But FDA publicity, broadly construed, 
comes in many more forms, perhaps reflecting the agency’s basic 
philosophy that “the public’s business must be and will be 
conducted in public.”241 Again, the Obama administration has 
emphasized transparency by agencies, but not all transparency is 
benign. Some authors call it “adverse transparency.”242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Letter regarding several Procter & Gamble over-the-counter drugs by mistake, attributing the 
mistake to “an internal systems error.” FDA clarified that “no warning letter has been sent to 
Procter & Gamble.” Note to Correspondents, FDA, Procter & Gamble Warning Letter Posted 
in Error (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm186832.htm.  
 238. See, e.g., Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, No. MJG-92-444, 1992 WL 208962, at *1 (D. 
Md. Aug. 17, 1992). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Levine, supra note 57, at 278. 
 241. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (Mar. 4, 1977) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 242. Roller et al., supra note 150, at 597. 
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I found FDA news announcements identifying particular 
companies or products under the following titles:  
 
• Media Transcript (of press briefings); 
• Press Announcement;  
• Press Release;  
• Talk Paper243; and 
• Warning Letter.244 
 
Moreover, the FDA labels its warnings about specific products 
and companies in many different ways, some of which have legal 
significance and some of which do not:245  
 
• Advice for Patients; 
• Consumer Updates; 
• Field Action Notification;  
• Field Correction;  
• Frequently Asked Questions; 
• Important Information;  
• Important Customer 
Notification;  
• Important Notice;  
• Market Withdrawal;
• Notice of Field Correction; 
• Notice to Readers; 
• Product Withdrawal; 
• Public Health Advisory; 
• Public Health Notification; 
• Recall; 
• Recovery Notice; 
• Safety Communication; 
 
 243. The public has long been confused about what the FDA Talk Papers signify. FDA 
Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,436. The FDA tried to clarify that 
Talk Papers are aimed internally at FDA personnel to ensure that their responses to public 
questions are uniform, attaching the disclaimer that Talk Papers are “For Internal Distribution 
Only.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘Talk Papers’ are not considered publicity 
subject to this proposal.”). Later Talk Papers included the disclaimer that “FDA Talk Papers 
are prepared by the Press Office to guide FDA personnel in responding with consistency and 
accuracy to questions from the public on subjects of current interest.” FDA, Talk Paper T01-
62: FDA Strengthens Warning for Droperidol (Dec. 5, 2001), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/3blyrbd. The FDA subsequently changed its position, noting that 
although Talk Papers were intended to provide more detailed information to guide agency 
staff, Talk Papers were “actively disseminated to the media” and the intended audience was the 
“[g]eneral [p]ublic.” CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1. As noted above, the FDA 
has published Talk Papers on its website that publicly criticize regulated companies. The FDA 
discontinued its use of Talk Papers in October 2005. See, e.g., Food, Nutrition and Cosmetics 
Announcements, FDA.GOV, http://tinyurl.com/4yk83mt (last updated Apr. 25, 2011). 
 244.  Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm 
(last updated Sept. 1, 2011).  
 245. For example, a product “withdrawal” and “correction” have different regulatory 
significance than a “recall.” Guidance for Industry: Product Recalls, Including Removals and 
Corrections, FDA.GOV (Nov. 3, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ 
IndustryGuidance/ucm129259.htm.  
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• Important Safety Information;
• Information Alert; 
• Information for Health Care 
Professionals; 
• Urgent Instruction 
Correction; 
• Urgent Removal; and 
• Urgent Notification.
  
Of course, the FDA often finds it necessary to announce product 
recalls, and this practice demonstrates the Catch-22 for agencies 
dealing with imperfect information and scientific uncertainty. On 
one hand, Gellhorn originally found that not only did the FDA 
arguably not have clear statutory authority to require recalls, but that 
the agency publicized recalls in excessive and damaging ways.246 
Other authors have been similarly critical of the FDA’s use of recalls 
in lieu of sanctions more explicitly authorized by statute.247  
On the other hand, courts generally protect the FDA’s discretion 
to warn the public about potential health hazards, which includes 
notifying the public of recalls and other product removals.248 To its 
credit, the FDA does not publicize all recalls, but reserves publicity 
for products that pose the most serious risks.249 Current FDA 
regulations call for manufacturers to cooperate with the FDA in 
publicizing the recall, noting that the FDA “in consultation with the 
recalling firm will ordinarily issue such publicity” itself, or at least 
provide written comments on the firm’s own publicity.250  
Aside from affirmatively issuing publicity, the FDA more 
passively makes negative information about companies public on its 
website, without drawing much attention to it. For example, it posts 
formal legal complaints, Warning Letters (which it sometimes 
publicizes), inspectional observations, and other documents stating 
objections that have yet to be resolved or adjudicated.251 In its 1977 
 
 246. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410–16. 
 247. Noah, supra note 7, at 874–75, 888. 
 248. See, e.g., Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 625, 626–27 (Ct. 
Cl. 1978) (holding the FDA had a rational basis for warning public through press releases 
about excessive lead in dishware). 
 249. For Consumers, FDA 101: Product Recalls—From First Alert to Effectiveness Checks, 
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm049070.htm (last 
updated Sept. 9, 2011).  
 250. 21 C.F.R. § 7.42(b)(2) (2010). Note that for Class I recalls, the most serious type 
of recall, it is the FDA’s policy to give “the recalling firm the first opportunity to prepare and 
issue publicity concerning its recall.” REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204, at 
§ 7-7-3.  
 251. Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm 
(last updated Sept. 9, 2011); Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal 
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proposal, the FDA tried to distinguish publicity that it intended to 
distribute to the mass media for further consumption from other 
notifications meant to educate or simply notify the public.252 But this 
distinction means very little when the FDA posts thousands of 
documents on its website that are reported by the media and trade 
press—without any specific efforts by the FDA to publicize them. 
Even more recent policies try to distinguish between information 
intended for the general public and for the media,253 although it is 
not clear what really distinguishes the two today.254 
As part of my review of FDA publicity, I tried measuring how 
frequently the FDA publicizes negative or adverse information about 
private parties, and the proportion that announced preliminary or 
pending actions rather than final, adjudicated ones. I reviewed all 
“Press Announcements” archived on the FDA’s Newsroom page, 
from 2004 to 2010.255 
  
 
Investigations, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/default.htm (last updated Jan. 25, 
2011). See Levine, supra note 57, at 278. 
 252. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,437 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (delineating publicity from the FDA Consumer 
magazine, the FDA Drug Bulletin, and other publications that report actions taken by FDA). 
 253. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2.  
 254. The chart on CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2, generally shows that 
information intended for the media is disseminated by the FDA’s press office and information 
intended for the general public is posted on FDA’s website, although the two overlap when 
FDA issues press releases, talk papers, and notes to correspondents.  
 255.  Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm 
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011).  
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 Year Total 
releases256 
(1) Identify 
private 
party or 
product?257
(2) 
Negative 
or 
adverse?258
(3) 
Preliminary 
or pending 
action?259
Percent of 
total that 
were (1), 
(2) and (3) 
2004 160 73/160 
(46%)
54/73 
(74%)
40/54 
(74%)
40/160 
(25%) 
2005 144 80/144 
(56%)
50/80 
(63%)
45/50 
(90%)
45/144 
(31%) 
2006 254 161/254 
(63%)
82/161 
(51%)
71/82 
(87%)
71/254 
(28%) 
2007 229 157/229 
(69%)
89/157 
(57%)
70/89 
(79%)
70/229 
(31%) 
2008 174 121/174 
(70%)
65/121 
(54%)
52/65 
(80%)
52/174 
(30%) 
2009 282 198/282 
(70%)
130/198 
(66%)
80/130 
(62%)
80/282 
(28%) 
2010 299 219/299 
(73%)
152/219 
(69%)
105/152 
(69%)
105/299 
(35%) 
Total 1542 1009/1542 
(65%)
622/1009 
(62%)
463/622 
(74%)
463/1542 
(30%) 
 
As illustrated on the chart, the FDA issued 1542 press 
announcements between 2004 and 2010, equating to almost one 
every business day. Although O’Reilly observed that “[t]he FDA 
does not overly rely upon publicity” and uses it only sparingly,260 my 
review suggests otherwise. 
 
 256. These numbers exclude duplicate press releases published in foreign languages. 
 257. Column (1) counts the number of press releases that identify a specific product, 
company, and/or individual in the title or body. Note that some press releases refer to types or 
categories of products without identifying specific products or manufacturers by name. I did 
not include these press releases in Column (1). 
 258. Column (2) refers to press releases that include negative or adverse information 
about a specific company, product, or individual. For example, FDA announcements that the 
agency has recalled a product or issued a Warning Letter are negative actions. The vast 
majority of positive announcements involve the FDA approving or clearing new products to 
market. 
 259. Column (3) refers to press releases that announce some sort of preliminary 
determination or pending agency action that has not reached a final, determinative conclusion. 
I counted recalls, seizures, Warning Letters, and import alerts as preliminary or pending actions 
because they are often based on preliminary information and have not been subject to agency 
adjudication or other final determination, even if a company initiated the recall voluntarily. 
Companies often initiate voluntary recalls in cooperation with, or with pressure from, the FDA. 
 260. O’REILLY, supra note 186, at §§ 22.42, 22.43 n.1 (citing Pines, supra note 165, at 
354) (noting that the FDA issued fewer than 50 press releases each year as of 1976, but 
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My review also finds that 65% of FDA press announcements 
during this period identify a specific product, company, or person 
(Column (1)). Of these, 62% are negative or adverse in some way 
(Column (2)). And of these, 74% announce a preliminary or pending 
action by the FDA that has not been fully resolved or adjudicated 
(Column (3)). For an agency that seems to appreciate that adverse 
publicity announcing preliminary actions can unfairly damage 
companies, the FDA certainly does not seem to shy away from the 
practice.  
Of course, the FDA can justify many of these adverse, 
preliminary announcements as protecting the public health, such as 
during a recall. And many other matters ultimately result in 
successful adjudications or settlements for the agency. Thus, the 
chart above is not meant to imply that the FDA is not justified in 
making most of these announcements. But the sheer volume of such 
announcements (463 out of 1542) raises the risk of errors or abuse. 
And no legal constraints deter errors or abuse, apart from internal 
self-discipline, such as the agency’s willingness to maintain legitimacy 
with repeat players, its desire to keep its enforcement powder dry, 
and its respect for due process, among other considerations.  
Compounding matters, the FDA consistently argues that its 
publicity is not subject to judicial review.261 Like Warning Letters, 
which the FDA defines by regulation as informal enforcement 
actions,262 the FDA considers adverse publicity to be a statutorily 
authorized form of informal enforcement.263 One court noted that 
the FDA cannot have it both ways, after the agency targeted 
particular companies through a publicity campaign: 
 
acknowledging that “the number may have increased in recent years”). 
 261. Noah, supra note 7, at 887 (noting that only once has a court allowed a challenge 
to an FDA warning letter to proceed). See, e.g., Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, Civ. A. No. MJG-92-
444, 1992 WL 208962, at *1, 5 (D. Md. Aug. 17 1992) (denying FDA’s motion to dismiss 
an action claiming that an FDA warning letter and related publicity against a company were 
not final agency actions, requiring instead a further hearing on the company’s standing to sue). 
 262. 21 C.F.R. § 100.2(j)(1) (1993). The FDCA states that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services need not report “minor violations” for prosecution “whenever he believes 
that the public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.” 21 
U.S.C. § 336 (2006). FDA “Warning Letters” typically identify alleged regulatory violations 
and ask the identified company to respond and take corrective action within a certain period of 
time, or else face formal enforcement. REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204, 
at § 4-1.  
 263. State Enforcement Provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 
58 Fed. Reg. 2457, 2457 (Jan. 6, 1993). 
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This Court cannot now say that a focused effort such as this may be 
is immune from judicial review because the agency says its decision 
is tentative and open to reconsideration. If the FDA’s view is, in 
fact, so tentative that it is not yet ripe for judicial review, it may not 
be appropriate to take actions which directly result in harm to those 
private parties who dare to disagree with them.264 
The court also objected that it would be “inherently unfair” to 
allow the FDA to use coercive methods such as threatening Warning 
Letters and adverse publicity to “‘enforce’ its determination without 
allowing the affected party an opportunity to prove that the FDA’s 
position is wrong.”265 But that is exactly the agency’s approach. And 
like other agencies, the FDA frequently invokes sovereign immunity 
and executive privilege to defend its use of adverse publicity.266 As a 
former lawyer in the FDA Chief Counsel’s Office cautions, “there is 
relatively little a company can do in most circumstances to 
significantly diminish the effect of [an FDA] release.”267 
These problems can be addressed in several ways. The agency has 
long struggled with insufficient resources and personnel to enforce 
its regulations.268 And its previously limited statutory authority to 
require mandatory as opposed to voluntary recalls for things like 
food products is well known.269 It remains to be seen whether 
increased funding and enhanced statutory authority will reduce the 
incentive to wield adverse publicity. Either way, the FDA is a 
fascinating case study, given its responsibilities to alert the public 
about certain health risks. 
 
 264. Den-Mat, 1992 WL 208962, at *5. The court noted the plaintiff’s allegations that 
the FDA’s public stance against the manufacturer “caused a significant decrease in sales, with 
an accompanying erosion of customer goodwill.” Id. at *4. 
 265. Id. at *5. 
 266. See, e.g., Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d, 
513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975).  
 267. Levine, supra note 57, at 277. 
 268. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING 
AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 151–76 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006); 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 4 
(2007).  
 269. Subcomm. on Regulations and Healthcare: Hearing on Impact of Food Recalls on 
Small Businesses Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (statement of 
Steven M. Solomon, Assistant Comm’r for Compliance Policy, Office of Regulatory Affairs, 
Food and Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.). Note, however, that in 2011, 
President Obama signed the Food Safety Modernization Act, which for the first time 
authorized the FDA to use mandatory recalls for all food products. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 
Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. (Supp. 2011)).  
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B. Other Agencies 
Other agencies offer variations on the FDA’s story. For example, 
the FTC restrains itself through written policies, and the CPSC 
adheres to clear congressional directives. The following looks at how 
other agencies fare compared to the FDA. 
1. Federal Trade Commission 
In 1973, Gellhorn lauded the FTC for having “the most 
sophisticated publicity policies and practices of the regulatory and 
executive agencies examined in [his] study.”270 Not only had the 
D.C. Circuit upheld the FTC’s approach,271 but the FTC was one of 
the only agencies to articulate its policies “in continually evolving 
agency rules, manuals, and guidebooks.”272 The FTC enunciated 
written policies in its Public Information Policy Guidebook, which 
made its policies clear to both agency personnel and the public.273 
Gellhorn praised the FTC’s policies as “both sensible and sensitive,” 
representing “a thoughtful attempt to balance administrative 
efficiency, the public’s need for warning, and private interests.”274 
The agency has also received judicial blessing to issue publicity,275 
and although it does not seem to have explicit statutory authority to 
do so, it probably has implicit authority.276 
 
 270. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388. 
 271. In FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), the FTC issued news releases announcing that it had “reason to believe” that 
several companies were engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices.  
 272. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388. 
 273. Id. (citing FTC, PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY GUIDEBOOK (1972)).  
 274. Id.  
 275. See, e.g., Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(stating that agency publications promote congressional intent); Cinderella Schools, 404 F.2d at 
1314 (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) authorized the agency to issue factual press releases 
concerning pending adjudications). 
 276. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388–93; Noah, supra note 7, at 890–91. The FTC has a 
strong case for implicit authority to issue publicity under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (2006), which 
states that the FTC has the authority “[t]o make public from time to time such portions of 
information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest . . . and to provide for the 
publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for 
public information and use.” The D.C. Circuit stated in Cinderella Schools that “Congress 
obviously has long been aware of and acquiesced in the Commission’s press release 
procedures.” 404 F.2d at 1314. Moreover, the court in FTC v. Freecom Communications 
stated that § 46(f) “specifically authorize[s] the FTC to make news releases.” 966 F. Supp. 
1066, 1067 (D. Utah 1997). Finally, the FTC Act allows the FTC to propose a complaint and 
notify the subject that it intends to file it unless the subject agrees to discontinue allegedly 
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Notwithstanding the agency’s efforts, since 1973 the FTC has 
been one of the most frequently sued agencies. Even so, courts 
almost uniformly interpret the FTC Act as granting the FTC broad 
discretion to issue publicity.277 Rarely do parties charge that the FTC 
violated its own policies and procedures, and when they do, courts 
generally reject these challenges out of hand, without much 
analysis.278 
The most recent federal case addressing agency publicity allowed 
the D.C. Circuit to articulate its latest thinking. In Trudeau v. 
FTC,279 the court resolved a long legal battle between the FTC and 
Kevin Trudeau, an infomercial entrepreneur who marketed various 
products as treatments for a wide range of medical conditions, like 
cancer and obesity.280 The FTC had filed several complaints alleging 
that Trudeau had engaged in false and deceptive trade practices.281 A 
final order prohibited Trudeau from participating in infomercials, 
with some narrow exceptions for books or other publications not 
marketing his services.282 Five days after the court entered the final 
order, the FTC described it in a press release on its website.283  
Trudeau sued the FTC after it refused to remove the press 
release from its website, arguing that the press release exceeded the 
agency’s statutory authority, mischaracterized the settlement, and 
retaliated against Trudeau for criticizing the FTC.284 He claimed that 
several aspects of the press release mischaracterized the nature of the 
settlement and obscured the fact that Trudeau never admitted to—
and no adjudicator had ever found—any wrongdoing.285 For 
example, the press release was titled “Kevin Trudeau Banned from 
Infomercials” and quoted an FTC employee saying that Trudeau had 
 
violative practices—a much less public type of pressure. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31, 
2.32 (2001). 
 277. See, e.g., Freecom, 966 F. Supp. at 1067. 
 278. See, e.g., FTC v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. CV 89-3818-RSWL, 1990 WL 
132719 at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting out of hand an allegation that FTC violated 
Operating Manual Ch. 17 § 2.5 because the FTC’s publicity largely tracked the preliminary 
injunction the agency had obtained). 
 279. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
 280. 456 F.3d at 180. 
 281. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 283–85. 
 282. Id. at 284. 
 283. Id. at 284–85. 
 284. Id. at 282–83. 
 285. Id. at 285–87; 456 F.3d at 194–97. 
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“mislead American consumers for years” and was a “habitual false 
advertiser.”286 Trudeau noted that several media reports 
characterized the settlement as a “ban” and his $2 million payment 
as a “fine.”287 He also argued that a Google search for “Kevin 
Trudeau” returned the FTC’s press release as the second result, 
which became the first result returned by the time the district court 
wrote its opinion.288 Trudeau also claimed that the publicity hurt his 
ability to contract with vendors and market his publications, citing 
an incident in which Ed McMahon backed out of promoting a 
Trudeau book.289 Trudeau asked the district court to require the 
FTC to clarify in the press release that the allegations were only 
allegations, and that the FTC had imposed no fines or penalties.290  
The court granted the FTC’s motion to dismiss on two grounds: 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the press release 
was not “final agency action” under APA § 704, and Trudeau could 
not state a valid cause of action.291  
Although the court recognized that agency publicity could 
constitute a sanction and thus qualify as final agency action under 
the APA in certain circumstances, no court had ever encountered 
such a case, and the FTC’s press release about Trudeau did not 
qualify.292 Trudeau did not produce evidence showing that the 
agency exceeded its authority, nor could he identify any “discernible 
harm.”293 
The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, though it 
disagreed that the court lacked jurisdiction.294 The D.C. Circuit 
assumed that Trudeau could assert several causes of action, but 
found that his allegations could not sustain them as a matter of law 
because the press release simply was not false or misleading.295 The 
 
 286. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285; 456 F.3d at 195. 
 287. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285–86; 456 F.3d at 196. 
 288. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285 n.3. Indeed, this has become a major area of concern for 
companies and individuals alike. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: 
GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 9–13 (2007) (discussing Google’s search 
results and their interminable memory). 
 289. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 
 290. Id at 287. 
 291. Id. at 288–90. 
 292. Id. at 289–90. 
 293. Id. at 293, 296–97. 
 294. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183–87 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 295. Id. at 191–97. 
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court found that “no reasonable person could misinterpret the press 
release” given the clarifying language in the subtitle and body, the 
accurate descriptions of the action, the disclaimer reemphasizing the 
nature of the settlement, and the links to the full documents, 
including settlement order.296 “In the end,” the D.C. Circuit found 
that the case “[came] down to whether Trudeau has the right to take 
a red pencil to the language of the FTC’s press release,” concluding 
that “[h]e does not.”297  
The Trudeau case illustrates a few points. First, even agencies 
with written policies like the FTC will sometimes issue publicity that 
private parties claim is unfair and punitive. Second, it can be difficult 
to prove that agency publicity was intended to punish or sanction. 
And third, even though the public (and markets) react to a headline, 
courts will go beyond the headline in asking whether “a reasonable 
person could misinterpret” the announcement. But one cannot help 
but wonder how many announcements would struggle to meet that 
standard with the truncated announcements typical of new media. 
2. Environmental Protection Agency 
Like the FDA, the EPA often justifies its announcements as 
necessary to protect public health. Also like the FDA, the EPA does 
not voluntarily restrain its discretion in ways that would address the 
long-standing concerns with publicity. The EPA does designate 
agency personnel to field objections that data entered on its website 
are incorrect.298 EPA staff marks such data with yellow flag icons.299 
But this policy does not extend to EPA announcements or other 
forms of publicity. 
The EPA has routinely publicized cases that it refers to the 
Justice Department for criminal prosecution, despite the Justice 
Department’s policy of being much more circumspect in making 
public statements before trial.300 Like FDA officials, EPA officials 
 
 296. Id. at 196–97. 
 297. Id. at 180. 
 298. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 514, 533–36. 
 299. Id. at 534. 
 300. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1402. Like many agencies, the EPA must rely on the 
Justice Department to prosecute criminal violations. Id. at 1401–03 (noting that EPA’s 
publicity during pretrial criminal cases made at least one U.S. Attorney “furious”). However, 
the Justice Department itself is not always so careful. For example, in U.S. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), Justice Department prosecutors prepared a press 
release and gave media interviews that interfered with a fair trial for individual defendants 
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recognize that strategic use of information “can be a supplement, 
sometimes even an alternative, to regulation” and can change how 
regulated parties behave.301  
Congress has shown some sensitivity to disclosures about private 
parties by the EPA, but in only one narrow context. In 1976, when 
Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act, it made it a 
crime for EPA employees to disclose information that private 
manufacturers had submitted to the agency and designated as 
confidential, unless the agency gave them prior notice.302 The Act 
requires the EPA to notify the private party thirty days before 
disseminating the information,303 unless the agency finds that 
disclosing the information is “necessary to protect health or the 
environment against an unreasonable risk of injury,” in which case 
the EPA must provide fifteen days notice.304 If the EPA believes 
there is an “imminent, unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment,” the prior notice requirement is cut to twenty-four 
hours.305 Again, this policy applies to information designated as 
confidential, but the procedures might form the basis for broader 
EPA policies addressing publicity. 
Another similarity with the FDA is that the EPA often finds it 
useful to publish its opinions about products, manufacturers, and 
overall regulatory conditions. For example, in one case the EPA and 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
published a “guide” recommending the use of two specific 
respirators to prevent inhaling asbestos, and recommending against 
using eleven other respirators, even though the eleven others had 
been federally certified.306 The D.C. Circuit held that the guide, 
despite being adverse to the eleven respirator manufacturers, was not 
a sanction or another form of reviewable “agency action” under the 
APA.307  
 
accused of distributing tainted pharmaceuticals. 
 301. Envtl. Law Inst., West Tower Philosopher, ENVTL. F., July–Aug. 1998, at 36 (quoting 
former EPA General Counsel Jonathan Cannon). 
 302. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, Tit. I § 14, 90 Stat. 2034 
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (2006)).  
 303. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (2006). 
 304. Id. at § 2613(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 307. Id. at 1117–21. 
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Ultimately, agencies like the EPA and FDA share much in 
common, and could benefit from adopting similar policies and 
procedures that preserve their discretion to make announcements in 
the interest of public health and safety. Congress should also 
consider whether public health agencies like the EPA and FDA have 
sufficiently clear statutory authority to make necessary public 
statements, as both agencies present compelling cases to retain wide 
discretion to do so. 
3. Consumer Product Safety Commission  
The CPSC is one of the only federal agencies to be guided by 
clear congressional directives governing its announcements. In 1982, 
Congress amended the Consumer Product Safety Act to require that 
the agency publish only information that is accurate and balanced.308 
The law followed several embarrassing incidents in which the CPSC 
identified allegedly unsafe products but released inaccurate 
information, costing the manufacturers significant amounts of 
money.309 Congress was concerned that the CPSC would unfairly 
publicize inaccurate information that might harm a company.310  
The amendments required the CPSC to: (1) assure that its public 
statements are accurate and fair; (2) give manufacturers advance 
notice and an opportunity to respond, subject to some exemptions, 
including emergencies; (3) respond to the manufacturer’s objections 
or face an injunction; and (4) retract errors in roughly the same 
manner that the agency made the original disclosure.311  
The law has made the CPSC more “cautious about naming 
individual products without careful internal review of the technical 
support documentation.”312 Still, the CPSC has been sued over 
public statements that do not mention a particular manufacturer.313 
 
 308. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b); O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 847. 
 309. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 542; Noah, supra note 7, 
at 890. The CPSC is authorized to declare products to be “substantial product hazards” after 
adjudicatory hearings. 15 U.S.C. § 2064. 
 310. H.R. REP. NO. 1153, at 32 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. H31,389 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 
1972) (statement of Rep. Crane).  
 311. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b). The CPSC promulgated regulations at 16 C.F.R. part 1101 
fleshing out these details. 
 312. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 848. 
 313. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1057–58 (D. Del. 
1976). 
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In fact, like the FDA and the FTC, the CPSC is one of the most 
frequently sued agencies for making public announcements.  
In one case, a court found that the CPSC had exceeded its 
statutory authority to notify the public of product risks because its 
press release announcing that toy dolls were “banned hazardous 
substances” was not a final determination and thus was not 
authorized to be disclosed under the statute.314 However, the court 
refused to order the CPSC to retract its statement because it was 
technically accurate, and because a retraction would only further 
confuse the public, as the allegations still had not been addressed by 
the court.315 This case shows why courts are often reluctant to 
intervene. 
In another case, an aluminum manufacturer sued the CPSC for 
violating the Act’s procedural protections for manufacturers, even 
though the CPSC’s public statements made only general statements 
about problems with aluminum wiring and did not mention the 
manufacturer or its products by name.316 The court held that Kaiser 
should be able to ask for a retraction, per the Act, but that Congress 
did not intend for manufacturers whose identities could not readily 
be ascertained to receive prior notice and an opportunity to 
comment.317 Like the FTC in Trudeau, the CPSC was sued despite 
taking precautions. 
These cases illustrate that parties regulated by the CPSC, as with 
parties regulated by the FDA and the EPA, are particularly sensitive 
to negative announcements. Although the agency continues to be 
sued for its practices, the Consumer Product Safety Act remains a 
model that Congress could apply to other agencies. 
4. Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC seems to appreciate more than other agencies the 
effects of adverse publicity,318 perhaps because its regulatory scheme 
tries to ensure that investors have access to both positive and 
negative information about public companies.  
 
 314. United States v. 52,823 Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK), 
1989 WL 140250, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989). 
 315. Id. at *7–8. 
 316. Kaiser Aluminum, 414 F. Supp. at 1057–58. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1394 n.48. 
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SEC complaints receive a lot of publicity, often generated by the 
agency itself, and courts have held that such publicity is part of the 
“expense and annoyance of litigation.”319 Injunctions rarely succeed 
unless the plaintiffs can show that the SEC is engaged in an 
aggressive and ongoing publicity campaign against the party.320 SEC 
regulations allow the subjects of preliminary investigations to, “on 
their own initiative, submit a written statement to the Commission” 
making their case.321 But this regulation does not confer procedural 
rights to litigants, and the SEC can file a formal complaint without 
violating the subject’s due process or statutory rights.322  
The SEC also has a policy that directs agency personnel to give 
advance notice to defendants of enforcement actions so they do not 
learn of complaints through the news.323 But an internal 
investigation found that SEC personnel do not always follow the 
policy, and that some are not even aware of it.324 
In 2010, some Congressmen criticized the SEC for publicizing 
charges against Goldman Sachs and allegedly trying to embarrass the 
company.325 The SEC filed its complaint without first notifying 
Goldman Sachs, in violation of agency policy.326 The agency also 
publicized the complaint via Twitter, just one week after establishing 
its SEC_News Twitter feed.327  
 
 319. First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205, 212 (D.N.J. 1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 
(1980)). 
 320. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc. v. SEC, No. C-81-546, 1982 WL 1566, at *4 (E.D. Wash. 
Jan. 20, 1982) (distinguishing its case from Silver King Mines v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666 (D. 
Utah 1966), in which the SEC was engaged in “an aggressively adverse publicity campaign 
against Silver King,” which was “so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to a due process 
violation”).  
 321. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2008). 
 322. Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). This case did not 
involve adverse publicity by the SEC, but instead involved general allegations that the SEC was 
abusive during its investigation, including a specific allegation that the agency disclosed 
privileged documents to private litigants.  
 323. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 57–59 (citing Administrative Regulation SECR 18-2 § 
B(15)(c)). 
 324. Id. 
 325. SEC, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 21489, THE SEC CHARGES GOLDMAN SACHS 
WITH FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRUCTURING AND MARKETING OF A SYNTHETIC 
CDO (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/ 
lr21489.htm.  
 326. SEC OIG, supra note 25 (citing Administrative Regulation SECR 18-2, § 
B(15)(c)). 
 327. SEC_News, TWITTER (Apr. 16, 2010), https://twitter.com/#!/SEC_News/status/ 
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The SEC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) subsequently 
investigated how the agency publicized the complaint, including 
allegations that SEC employees had leaked details to the New York 
Times prior to filing charges.328 Although the review found no 
evidence of such a leak, it did note that at least one news reporter 
knew that the SEC had scheduled a decision on the Commission’s 
nonpublic calendar a day before the complaint was filed.329 
The OIG’s report provides a remarkable inside view of the 
Commission’s internal deliberations when choosing to publicize a 
complaint.330 The document reveals that although the SEC was 
acutely aware of how to maximize publicity for its complaint against 
Goldman Sachs, it was relatively oblivious to the massive market 
reaction that it might trigger. For example, SEC personnel were well 
aware that announcing two cases on the same day would dilute the 
publicity for both, and that announcing on a Friday typically reduces 
media coverage.331 But employees were “shocked” and “quite 
surprised” about the resulting media coverage and market 
reaction.332 Goldman Sachs’s stock price fell 13%, “the biggest one-
day decline in its stock in over a year.”333 
The report also confirmed that agency publicity can be driven by 
many motives: the SEC wanted to show taxpayers that it was 
enforcing the law; it wanted to deter other violations; it wanted to 
control the message by beating a media-savvy company like 
Goldman Sachs to the punch; and it wanted to ensure accuracy.334 
No e-mails, internal documents, or sworn testimony showed that the 
SEC intended to punish Goldman Sachs. But there was significant 
internal discussion about using announcements strategically during 
investigations and how advanced notice of such announcements 
 
12303044878. The earliest tweets for this feed were published on April 9, 2010. 
 328. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 12.  
 329. Id. at 31–32. 
 330. Id. at 1–2. To wit, the Inspector General reviewed over 3.4 million e-mails from 
sixty-four SEC employees during the time. It also took sworn testimony from thirty-two 
witnesses and reviewed documents from the agency, the New York Times, and Bloomberg 
Media. 
 331. Id. at 49, 51, 55. 
 332. Id. at 65–66. 
 333. Id. at 65. 
 334. Id. at 49, 55, 61–62. 
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might encourage gamesmanship by regulated firms and discourage 
efforts to settle cases.335 
In the end, the OIG found that SEC personnel did not follow 
and were not aware of the Commission’s publicity policies.336 The 
report recommended that the SEC consider revising the policy and 
give better guidance to staff on how to apply it.337  
5. Other agencies 
The experiences of other agencies are hard to generalize, given 
the diversity of agencies and agency practices. But even a superficial 
glimpse confirms some of the observations above.  
Although a few agencies have adopted rules or standards, none 
approach the recommendations by Gellhorn and ACUS. For 
example, the predecessor to the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) issued regulations governing its use of 
publicity in 1976, though it narrowly defined the scope of publicity 
that it covered.338 The Department of Justice has published rules on 
issuing publicity, which are largely tailored to ensure that officials do 
not make public statements that might influence the outcome of 
pending or future trials.339 In 1975, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) adopted policies for announcing 
regulatory actions.340 This policy, which is not available on its web 
site but is referenced in cases,341 states that the ATF will issue press 
releases describing significant regulatory actions.342 Overall, some 
agency policies do address adverse publicity, though not in anything 
approaching the comprehensive manner recommended by ACUS. 
Congress has also authorized some agencies to issue publicity, 
even if it is clearly adverse. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
 
 335. Id. at 57–64. 
 336. Id. at 65. 
 337. Id. at 77. 
 338. Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2–3 (Jan. 2, 1976) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 339. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2010).  
 340. ATF, INDUSTRY CIRCULAR 1975-21: PUBLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 
TAKEN BY ATF (Dec. 11, 1975), available at http://ttb.gov/industry_circulars/archives/ 
1975/75-21.html. 
 341. Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 118 (Fed. Cl. 1997), 
modified, 41 Fed Cl. 581 (Fed. Cl. 1998). 
 342. See id. at 118 (citing ATF, supra note 340). 
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(USDA) is authorized by statute to disseminate information343 and 
has been sued for doing so.344 The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to notify the public of safety 
defects with automobiles.345 The NHTSA must alert registered 
vehicle owners of defects, even if the manufacturer objects.346 But 
Gellhorn found that, like most agencies, the NHTSA had “not 
subjected its publicity program to rigorous examination” and had no 
rules or policies governing its practices.347 Years later, the NHTSA 
still clings to the notion that corrective publicity can undo any 
errors,348 despite Gellhorn’s caution that the public does not digest 
corrective press releases quite the same way.  
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognizes that 
adverse publicity can encourage companies to comply with its 
regulations.349 Yet, it has taken conflicting approaches on whether to 
mitigate civil penalties based on adverse publicity from the 
enforcement action itself.350 Similarly, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) acknowledges that publicizing investigations 
that have not resulted in a formal complaint can be unfair,351 but 
continues to do so anyway.352 
 
 343. 7 U.S.C. § 430 (2006). 
 344. Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 345. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118–19; Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1416 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1402 
(repealed 1994)). 
 346. Determination of Manufacturer’s Obligation, 49 C.F.R. § 557.8 (2010). 
 347. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1419. 
 348. For example, the NHSTA stated that suppliers whose components are erroneously 
identified as defective in recall notices can simply counter “[a]ny adverse publicity that does 
erroneously affect a supplier . . . by publicizing the correct information when it becomes 
available.” Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect and Noncompliance Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,254, 
17,257 (Apr. 5, 1995). 
 349. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revisions to Procedures to Issue Orders, 
56 Fed. Reg. 40,664, 40,683 (Aug. 15, 1991). 
 350. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty on 
Reich Geo-Physical, Inc., 49 Fed. Reg. 44,253, 44,255 (Nov. 5, 1984) (“NRC’s Enforcement 
Policy states that enforcement actions are publicly available and that press releases are generally 
issued for civil penalties and Orders. Mitigation of civil penalties because of adverse publicity 
suffered by a licensee is not considered in the Enforcement Policy to be a basis for mitigating 
civil penalties.”). But see Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order Imposing Civil Monetary 
Penalties on Inspection and Testing, Inc., 49 Fed. Reg. 28,781, 28,783 (July 16, 1984) 
(mitigating civil monetary penalties based in part on the loss caused by adverse publicity from 
the enforcement action and the NRC’s attendant press release). 
 351. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Rules Relating to Investigations, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 47,556, 47,557 (Nov. 19, 1985). 
 352. See, e.g., News Release, FERC, FERC Launches Investigation into Pipeline Rates 
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These and other agencies deserve more scrutiny, not only 
because they offer variations on the FDA’s story, but because they 
also appear to be using adverse publicity in ways that invoke long-
standing concerns. 
V. RENEWING THE CALL FOR STANDARDS 
Given these findings, I propose several ways that courts, 
Congress, and agencies themselves can impose standards on adverse 
agency publicity. I revisit the recommendations by Gellhorn and 
ACUS based on the trends since 1973 described in Part III, 
agencies’ responses, and the case law canvassed in Part IV.  
A. Should Publicity Be Used To Punish? 
A threshold question is whether agencies should be able to use 
adverse publicity to punish, deter, or otherwise sanction regulated 
parties. Doing so can result in burdens that are more severe than 
those authorized by statute, and regulated parties often cannot 
challenge these actions in court.353 Indeed, as Lars Noah argues, such 
arm-twisting “may be even more insidious than the frequently 
discussed tendency of agencies to develop informal but essentially 
binding policies without adhering to notice and comment 
rulemaking procedures.”354 Moreover, because the problem often 
evades judicial review, some scholars have called for agencies to 
exercise greater self-restraint.355 
Others recognize the power of publicity in another way, by 
calling for Congress and courts to employ it as a form of punitive 
damages on corporate wrongdoers.356 The U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines authorize publicity in some circumstances.357 Gellhorn 
acknowledged that an agency deciding to issue adverse publicity is 
 
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2010/2010-4/11-18-10-G-
3.asp (announcing investigations into the rates charged by two gas companies, Kinder Morgan 
Interstate Gas Transmission and Ozark Gas Transmission).  
 353. See Noah, supra note 7, at 875. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 876; Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1421. 
 356. See generally FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20; Curcio, supra note 161; Cowan, 
supra note 20. These recommendations often reference Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet 
Letter (1850) and colonial forms of punishment. 
 357. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B1.4 (applying § 5F1.4), 8D1.4(a) 
(2010); Cowan, supra note 20, at 2387. 
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somewhat analogous to a prosecutor exercising prosecutorial 
discretion.358 In fact, because regulatory violations can sometimes 
trigger criminal prosecutions, agencies and the Justice Department 
have been sued for issuing pretrial publicity.359 Still others point out 
that adverse publicity does not always deter wrongdoing.360  
Nevertheless, adverse publicity can be a blunt instrument that 
injures companies in ways that courts or agencies cannot calibrate. 
Agencies should not be able to punish alleged regulatory violators 
with indeterminate sanctions without providing some sort of 
procedural relief.361 The Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive 
fines,”362 and adverse publicity can generate “fines” or punishments 
that are “determined later by the capricious jury of public 
opinion.”363 Thus, neither agencies nor legislatures can define the 
upper or lower limits of such punishment.364 Agencies should be 
limited to issuing factual publicity that fulfills a legitimate statutory 
purpose, such as warning the public of health hazards or 
considerable financial risks. If this unduly restricts agencies’ capacity 
to regulate effectively, then Congress should enhance their statutory 
enforcement authority and provide enough resources to use these 
statutory powers. 
 
 358. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1381 n.4. 
 359. In United States v. Abbott Laboratories, Justice Department prosecutors and FDA 
officials issued press releases and made statements to the media after a grand jury indictment 
charged Abbott and five employees with distributing pharmaceuticals that were potentially 
deadly. 505 F.2d 565, 568–69 (4th Cir. 1974). Although both the district court and the 
Fourth Circuit strongly condemned FDA and Justice Department lawyers for jeopardizing the 
right to a fair trial, the Fourth Circuit reversed a decision by the district court dismissing the 
charges because there were other ways to protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial short of 
dismissal. Id. at 571–72. The court explained,  
[W]e join in the district court’s condemnation of this conduct and express our 
strongest disapproval that highly placed legal officers would make a statement of this 
import with regard to a pending criminal prosecution, and even more so that FDA, 
which had referred the matter to the Department of Justice, would issue a press 
release containing such prejudicial material. 
Id. at 571.  
 360. For example, Lochner and Cain express doubts that adverse publicity deters 
offenders of campaign finance laws. Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the 
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1919–20 (1999). 
 361. Even Professor Curcio, who proposes using adverse publicity as a formal sanction, 
acknowledges that it is indeterminate. Curcio, supra note 161, at 377–78.  
 362. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 363. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 310. 
 364. Id. 
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B. Agencies Should Articulate Standards 
When Gellhorn published his article in 1973, very few agencies 
provided written guidance on issuing press releases.365 Today, not 
much has changed. Most agencies have an Office of Public Affairs or 
an equivalent, though few provide written guidelines on making 
media announcements.366 Very few of the cases I surveyed alleged 
that the agency violated its own internal procedures,367 in part 
because very few agencies have such procedures (or at least publish 
them). Moreover, very few agencies are governed by statutes that 
specifically require confidentiality and constrain their public 
statements—and even when they are, courts have struggled to find 
suitable remedies.368 Thus, the overarching purpose of the following 
recommendations is not to completely remove agency discretion to 
issue adverse publicity but to domesticate it with substantive and 
procedural safeguards.369  
1. Content guidelines 
Agencies should adopt policies governing the content of 
publicity, including guidelines for condensed announcements in new 
media formats like Twitter. Even though agencies may be checked 
by internal protocols, as well as by “custom, habit, and natural 
bureaucratic caution,”370 the stakes are too high to rely on these 
alone. Agencies with written policies tend to abuse publicity less than 
agencies without them.371 Publishing policies not only would notify 
 
 365. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384 (citing the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare’s Department Staff Manual), 1388 (citing the FTC’s Public Information Policy 
Guidebook), 1396–97 (citing various SEC memoranda). 
 366. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838 n.13 (citing only the HHS policy and 
a since-retracted proposed policy from the FDA in 1976). 
 367. See, e.g., FTC v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. CV 89-3818-RSWL, 1990 WL 
132719 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 1990) (alleging that the FTC violated FTC Operating Manual 
Ch. 17 § 2.5 but holding that the alleged violation was not severe enough to modify or vacate 
a preliminary injunction). 
 368. For example, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-8(e) prohibit employees of the 
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) from making charges public during 
investigations and early adjudicatory proceedings. In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court 
refused to dismiss the EEOC’s claims of unfair employment practices against Sears even 
though the EEOC had leaked its complaint to the public. 504 F. Supp. 241, 269–70 (N.D. Ill. 
1980). 
 369. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1429. 
 370. Id. at 1419. 
 371. Id. at 1423 n.174 (comparing the FTC’s record to the EEOC’s). 
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regulated parties of agency standards, but would encourage agency 
personnel to exercise their discretion wisely, serving a prophylactic 
purpose.372 
First, agency policies should instruct personnel to avoid using 
excessively disparaging terminology. For example, “FTC officials 
scrupulously avoid comments likely to prejudice the respondent’s 
case.”373 The FDA once announced that it would avoid using 
“disparaging terminology” that is “not essential to the purpose of 
the publicity.”374 The FDA also explained that it could not avoid 
using disparaging terminology in all cases, particularly when warning 
the public about a particular company or product.375 And in at least 
one recent case, a court declined to enjoin the FTC despite an 
announcement that described the alleged violator as a “habitual false 
advertiser.”376 The court noted that the press release correctly 
attributed the comment to a single FTC employee rather than any 
adjudicator or fact finder,377 noting that “[a] cause of action does not 
exist under the APA every time a government official characterizes 
someone an agency is investigating.”378 Courts have also upheld 
FDA publicity when the FDA allegedly called health food and 
dietary supplement manufacturers “quacks” and “faddists,” even 
though FDA disputed using those words.379 Thus, it is important 
that agency policies instruct personnel not to use such language, 
because courts virtually never provide a remedy for its use.  
Agency policies should also require that agencies clarify the 
nature of the action as best as possible. This is particularly important 
for new media, like Twitter, that make incredibly truncated 
announcements. Companies are rightly concerned that agency 
publicity can misstate the nature of the agency’s action or mislead 
 
 372. Noah, supra note 7, at 940. 
 373. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1390. 
 374. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 375. Id. at 12,437. 
 376. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 377. Id.; Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 378. Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.12. Similarly, in another case, a court refused to 
grant a protective order against the FTC when its lead counsel sent a letter to local media 
inviting them to read the FTC’s complaint and stating that the company’s advertisements were 
“simply false.” FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1068–1069 (D. Utah 
1997). 
 379. Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 212, 218 (D.N.J. 1974), 
aff’d mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). 
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the public to believe that the allegations are more definitive than 
they really are.380 Agencies should adopt a policy similar to that of 
the FTC. When the FTC announces that it has brought a formal 
complaint, agency officials generally try to clarify that the case has 
not yet been adjudicated and explain the procedural posture.381  
But it is not clear whether such disclaimers are effective. 
Regulated companies believe that FTC press releases fail to 
adequately emphasize “the tentative nature of the charges filed,” 
which further invites the media and the public to interpret a 
complaint as a final determination of wrongdoing.382 The public 
tends to believe that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.”383 New 
media make it even more difficult to communicate legal and 
regulatory nuance. But agency policies should encourage 
announcements to inform without overstating.  
Since 1973, courts have upheld the use of press release titles that 
imply a finding of wrongdoing when the subtitle and body clarify 
otherwise.384 But agencies should be careful not to make such 
implications because the media can easily misconstrue them. Thus, a 
press release title stating that a regulated party has been “banned” 
from certain conduct could more accurately state that the parties 
“agreed” to such a ban.385 Agencies certainly are not “obliged to 
repeat every word or phrase in a settlement” in press releases.386 But 
they also should avoid using language in titles and headings that are 
likely to be misinterpreted, particularly in new media blurbs.387 
 
 380. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1061–62 
(D. Del. 1976) (alleging that the CPSC’s public statements misled the public to believe that 
the CPSC had made a final determination based on more solid evidence than it really had). 
 381. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1390–91 n.35 (noting that after the Cinderella Schools 
case the FTC included the following disclaimer in a black box on press releases announcing or 
implying that a firm has violated the law: “NOTE: The FTC issues a complaint when it has 
‘reason to believe’ that the law has been violated. Such action does not imply adjudication of 
the matters alleged.”).  
 382. Id. at 1391. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 178 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that “[b]y its nature, a title will not always capture the full 
detail of the document it is describing,” and noting that the press release in that case 
“accurately complete[d] the picture not only once but twice”).  
 385. See, e.g., id. (noting that the FTC clarified the potentially misleading title twice in 
the subtitle and body of the press release). 
 386. Id. at 292. 
 387. Id. at 285–86. Note that although several media outlets correctly interpreted the 
nature of the FTC’s announcement in Trudeau, some did not. 
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Courts are correct that press releases can always be written to be 
more objective and accurate, and that agencies “cannot be blamed 
because certain media reports inaccurately reported an accurate press 
release.”388 But agencies should strive for press releases that will not, 
in fact, be misinterpreted. And they should recognize that new 
media are extremely condensed, and that even noncondensed forms 
can contain inaccuracies.389  
Agencies should also consider not only the accuracy of particular 
statements, but the impressions left by the announcement as a 
whole. In one case, the CPSC announced in a press release that 
although its investigation was inconclusive and there was no risk of 
serious harm to consumers, it remained concerned about the 
manufacturer’s products and simply did not have the budget to 
substantiate its concerns.390 The press release then included a list of 
precautions for consumers using that entire class of products, even 
though the focus of the investigation discussed in the press release 
was clearly limited to one manufacturer’s products.391 Agencies 
should avoid this type of subterfuge. 
Although media outlets have been sued for libel for 
misinterpreting agency press releases, these claims can be very 
difficult to sustain against media organizations with reporting 
privileges, absent evidence of malice or intentional 
misrepresentation.392 Agencies, of course, maintain the discretion to 
issue publicity, “even if there is the possibility that the information 
may be ignored, misinterpreted, oversimplified, overstated, or 
misunderstood by the media or by the public.”393  
Agencies should maintain discretion, but should not be oblivious 
to these concerns. Agency policies should aim for publicity that will 
 
 388. Id. at 293.  
 389. For example, in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 
817 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a debt collection company that was the subject of an FTC press release 
announcing charges against that company and several others sued several newspapers and wire 
services for libel for inaccurately stating that the FTC made certain charges against that 
company.  
 390. Reliance Elec. v. CPSC, 924 F.2d 274, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 391. Id. at 281–82. 
 392. Trans World Accounts, 425 F. Supp. at 821–22 (finding no evidence that wire 
services incorrectly reporting an FTC press release did so intentionally or with malice, but 
allowing discovery of newspaper company’s knowledge and motives). 
 393. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,437 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
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not in fact be misprocessed. To aid in this effort, press releases 
posted on agency websites and via new media, like Twitter, should 
include prominent links to any underlying documents, including 
complaints and orders, so that those reading the press release can 
appreciate that it summarizes facts and proceedings that may be far 
more complicated.394 
2. Procedures for issuing adverse publicity 
Given all the ways agencies can issue publicity today, it is 
probably more important than ever that agencies articulate 
procedures for doing so. The recommendations by Gellhorn and 
ACUS are still worth pursuing. Agencies should establish standards 
for determining whether to issue publicity,395 whether it is 
necessary,396 whether there are alternatives that are equally 
effective,397 whether the supporting information is reliable,398 and the 
likelihood of causing severe harm to the subject.399 Policies should 
also make clear who within the agency may issue publicity and 
should direct media inquiries away from agency investigators and 
litigators.400 Finally, the core recommendations—that agencies 
should notify private parties in advance, give those parties an 
opportunity to comment, and set up procedures to retract incorrect 
statements401—would go a long way towards ameliorating the 
problems that have persisted since 1973. Once a commitment to 
 
 394. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the FTC’s press 
release announcing a settlement included prominent links to “Related Documents,” including 
the Final Order that was the subject of the press release). 
 395. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1424. 
 396. Id. at 1425–26; Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839, 16,839 (June 27, 1973) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305). For 
example, Gellhorn recommended that the FTC “limit the use of publicity to cases in which it 
was necessary to warn the public about imminent danger,” among other circumstances. 
Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1427. 
 397. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426. ACUS urged agencies to use adverse publicity 
“only to the extent necessary to foster agency efficiency, public understanding, or the accuracy 
of news coverage.” Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 398. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426; Recommendations of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
 399. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1427–28. 
 400. Id. at 1430. 
 401. Id. at 1431; Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1434 
these policies is in place, agencies can receive latitude to tailor these 
policies to fit their unique situations.  
Of course, some of these recommendations leave open questions. 
a. The least burdensome alternative? This Article argues that 
agencies should be held to an abuse of discretion standard, and when 
applying this standard, courts should consider whether an agency 
could have used less harmful options than issuing adverse publicity, 
keeping in mind that some industries are more sensitive to adverse 
publicity than others.402  
But Gellhorn’s recommendation that adverse publicity be a 
response of last rather than first resort has generated some debate. 
ACUS recommended that agencies not issue publicity when the 
targets could avoid harming the public by ceasing the offending 
practice.403 The FDA responded to these recommendations by 
arguing that this resolution will rarely work for the firms it regulates 
because their products may already be in commerce “or in people’s 
homes.”404 Again, agencies should be able to customize their 
standards. 
 
b. The timing of publicity? The timing of publicity remains a hotly 
disputed topic. Publicizing the results of an official adjudication 
rarely generates objections; but publicizing that the agency has 
merely begun an investigation or filed a formal complaint can 
unfairly damage the parties named. Regulated parties obviously 
prefer that an agency notify them in private before publicizing 
contemplated action.405 But at least one court has called adverse 
publicity part of “the expense and annoyance of litigation.”406 
This is nothing new of course. As early as 1918, the FTC 
adopted a policy of issuing press releases whenever it filed 
complaints.407 In 1968, the D.C. Circuit upheld this practice.408 The 
 
 402. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410, 1416–18 (noting that the public tends to be much 
more sensitive to food safety hazards than automobile hazards). 
 403. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 38 Fed. 
Reg. at 16,839.  
 404. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 405. See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1394. 
 406. First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205, 212 (D.N.J. 1982) (quoting FTC 
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 407. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388–89. 
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court seemed to use a “probable cause” standard, explaining that the 
FTC may “alert the public to suspected violations of the law by 
factual press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to 
believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by 
the Act.”409 Decades later, the FTC still publicizes its allegations.410 
For example, the court in FTC v. Freecom Communications denied a 
protective order against the FTC after the agency’s lead counsel sent 
a letter to local media describing the FTC’s complaint, in part 
because the court found that it was obvious that the letter stated the 
counsel’s opinion rather than any “particularized fact.”411 Another 
court even defended the FTC’s use of such publicity, recognizing 
that the agency publicizes complaints in part “to induce respondents 
to agree promptly to remedial orders without the necessity of 
extended legal proceedings.”412 Congress should resolve whether 
these practices should be allowed given each agency’s statutory 
authority and funding constraints. 
Similarly, Congress rarely limits agency discretion to publicize 
preliminary actions. My research found only two federal statutes that 
specifically prohibit an agency from publicizing investigations. One 
statute prohibits the Federal Election Commission (FEC) from 
publicizing investigations into suspected violations of campaign 
finance laws due to concerns that it would be premature and 
unfair.413 Another statute prohibits the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from “making public” 
information that it obtains while investigating or negotiating with 
employers suspected of violating employment discrimination laws.414  
 
 408. See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1313–14 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing sections 5 and 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 45(a)–(b), 46(f) (1964)). 
 409. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added). 
 410. See, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Utah 1997).  
 411. Id. at 1068–69. Counsel’s letter to the media stated: “I invite you to take a look at 
the evidence in the files of the District Court. That evidence shows that the defendants have 
misrepresented [how successful their customers have been] . . . . The defendants continue to 
use success stories and testimonials that are simply false.” Id. at 1068.  
 412. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal. 
1977). 
 413. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(B), (a)(12)(A) (2006); 
Common Cause v. FEC, 83 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 414. Civil Rights Act §§ 706(b), 709(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that these sections 
prohibited the EEOC from disclosing information not only to the public in general, but also 
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Outside these two narrow contexts, most agencies “regularly 
publicize every significant formal action,” even when doing so is not 
necessary to warn the public.415 As noted above, my survey of FDA 
press announcements between 2004 and 2010 found that 30% of 
these announcements disclosed pending or preliminary actions that 
had not been fully adjudicated.416  
Sometimes preliminary announcements can be justified on 
pragmatic grounds; for example, when agency complaints are already 
public. And agencies do not always have the luxury of waiting for 
cases to conclude, such as when announcing product recalls or other 
public health hazards.417 But agencies should develop standards for 
publicizing pending and preliminary actions, and Congress should 
authorize them when necessary.  
Agencies often find themselves in a no-win situation, as when 
they are criticized for not announcing information early enough. 
Gellhorn observed that NHTSA notifications of vehicle defects 
tended to be less damaging because they “often occur months after 
the defect is first suspected, and they are usually preceded by lengthy 
and thorough testing in which the manufacturer has a chance to 
participate.”418 But the NHTSA has also been criticized for not 
alerting the public earlier to suspected safety defects, such as the 
recent safety problems surrounding Toyota vehicles.419  
To avoid defaulting to either extreme—disclosing too early or 
too late—agencies should articulate standards for when to release 
publicity, so that their decisions are at least consistent. Moreover, to 
the extent feasible, agencies should notify the subjects of publicity 
and solicit their input before the statement issues. When agencies 
provide basic notice and an opportunity to comment, even 
informally, these gestures tend to defuse concerns.420 
 
to parties outside the government that brought Title VII employment discrimination charges). 
 415. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1392. 
 416. See supra Part IV.A (finding that 463 out of 1,542 press releases announced 
tentative actions rather than final, determinative actions). 
 417. Note that a significant portion of FDA press releases announcing pending or 
preliminary actions also announced product recalls or made other announcements that 
ostensibly could be justified on public health grounds. 
 418. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418. 
 419. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S2759–60 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Barbara Boxer). 
 420. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418. 
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Of course, regulated parties might abuse any procedural 
protections or appeals mechanisms that agencies make available, 
particularly to delay announcements.421 Again, agencies should retain 
some discretion to publish announcements before responding to 
private parties—for example, by justifying publicity when the agency 
perceives that there is an imminent public health emergency—and 
courts can review agency decisions for an abuse of discretion ex post. 
Courts should also consider whether private parties abused these 
procedures. 
c. Postpublication procedures? Agencies should adopt procedures 
for retracting and correcting any inaccurate or misleading statements 
with at least the same force and vigor as the initial statement. 
Though such retractions are infamous for going unnoticed,422 
agencies should strive for symmetry between negative and positive 
disclosures, much as some agencies like the FDA and SEC require 
from regulated parties. Currently, agencies publicize when they file 
complaints or bring successful enforcement actions, but rarely 
announce that investigations found no wrongdoing, that complaints 
failed, or that enforcement actions otherwise did not succeed. And 
when agencies do make positive announcements, they typically do 
not publicize them with the same vigor, nor does the media give 
them the same amount of attention.423 One exception is the FTC’s 
practice of publishing a “closing letter” if an investigation into 
possible regulatory violations finds no wrongdoing.424 Other agencies 
should consider this type of device. 
Agencies should also instruct parties how to request corrections 
or retractions, even if this entails filing a citizens’ petition or 
something similar.425 O’Reilly notes that removing disputed 
information is often the preferred remedy, followed closely by 
 
 421. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 546–47. 
 422. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849. 
 423. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1391–92 (noting that the FTC failed to adequately 
correct or publicize its erroneous adverse publicity, announcing that DuPont deceptively 
marketed its antifreeze, Zerex, despite the FTC’s later finding that the more serious charges it 
had alleged were unfounded). 
 424. FTC, COMMISSION CLOSING LETTERS, http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/ 
commclosing.shtm (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).  
 425. See, e.g., FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 
12,440 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (notifying parties that they may 
request corrections or retractions to FDA publicity through the citizens petition procedures, 
now available at 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010)). 
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retraction and correction.426 Agencies are more than capable of 
maintaining distribution lists and reaching the same audience 
twice.427  
Agencies should also allow companies to file expedited requests. 
For example, the FDA’s 1977 proposed publicity policy instructed 
parties to send expedited requests in writing to the Assistant 
Commissioner for Public Affairs.428 O’Reilly suggests that agencies 
should have a limited time to review disputed information on 
websites, and his recommendation applies equally to adverse 
publicity.429 Agencies should establish internal deadlines for resolving 
the dispute and publish such deadlines. Once agencies adopt these 
basic principles, they can meet their diverse needs by tailoring the 
guidelines to meet their reasonable policy goals.  
Agencies might also use an ombudsman or a Chief Information 
Officer to review disputes about agency publicity.430 Some federal 
agencies use an ombudsman’s office to mediate disputes between 
private parties and the agency, and some are even required to do so 
by statute.431 By taking these steps, agencies could generate more 
credibility with industries and the media, and perhaps deter 
litigation.432 
d. Distinguishing active versus passive publicity? Another debate 
that seems to be more pressing today than in 1973 is whether a 
distinction should be made between actively and passively releasing 
information. Although agencies today can passively release 
information, this information may be quickly picked up by the trade 
 
 426. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 534–36 (arguing that 
agencies should flag and quickly remove inaccurate data posted on websites, much like the 
EPA does with its national Envirofacts database of local environmental conditions). 
 427. Professor O’Reilly notes that agencies would have to retain precise recipient lists to 
do so. Id. at 536. However, when the cat is out of the bag, it can be exceedingly difficult to 
recapture it, particularly when multiple agencies are responsible for disseminating information. 
For an almost comical effort by federal and state law enforcement agencies to retract earlier 
warnings and rumors that proved to be erroneous, see Lance Industries, Inc. v. United States, 3 
Cl. Ct. 762 (Cl. Ct. 1983).  
 428. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,440–41. 
 429. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 537. 
 430. Id. at 538–39. 
 431. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 657 (2006) (creating an ombudsman to mediate disputes 
between agencies and small businesses); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, 
at 539. 
 432. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 848. 
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press, law firm client alerts, and bloggers. Agencies need not 
aggressively publicize this information to have the same practical 
effect. Thus, the distinction between issuing a press release and 
simply releasing information, such as through a FOIA request, is less 
meaningful today than it was in 1973.433  
Agencies themselves may distinguish between actively 
disseminating publicity that it believes “to be true and that the 
public should rely on,” and merely releasing information passively 
without making any express or implicit endorsements about it.434 
Indeed, courts have recognized that FOIA responses by agencies do 
not carry the same “government imprimatur on the document” as 
affirmative statements by the agency.435 Agencies might consider 
imposing more constraints on information that carries an explicit 
endorsement by the agency. 
Ultimately, agencies must tailor these recommendations to their 
needs and statutory responsibilities. As the D.C. Circuit has stated, 
the trick is “to accommodate two separate goals of fair administrative 
process: protecting parties from false or unauthorized agency news 
releases and promoting Congress’ clear mandate that government 
information, particularly from consumer-oriented agencies, reach the 
public.”436 It is essential that agencies retain discretion to alert the 
public, particularly when required to do so by statute, but agencies 
should not abuse this discretion.  
C. Congress and Courts Should Hold Agencies Accountable 
Contemporary scholarship concludes that neither federal statutes 
nor courts provide remedies for private parties injured by adverse 
agency publicity.437 In this section I argue that Congress should 
 
 433. Note that in 1980, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between active versus 
passive disclosures of information by the CPSC under the Consumer Product Safety Act. 
CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 107–08 (1980).  
 434. Id. at 107. Although this may have been merely a litigating position by the CPSC to 
reduce its responsibilities when responding to FOIA requests, other agencies have responded 
to FOIA requests with explanations or clarifications of the nature of the information. See, e.g., 
Reliance Elec. Co. v. CPSC, 924 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. 
CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the Consumer Product Safety Act’s 
disclosure procedures did not apply to disclosures pursuant to FOIA requests). 
 435. Pierce & Stevens, 585 F.2d at 1388. 
 436. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 437. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 7, at 889–91; O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 
838; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 511–12. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1440 
clarify which agencies can issue adverse publicity and when. In the 
more likely event that Congress fails to act with such precision, I 
suggest that courts (i) hold agencies to their own articulated 
standards, (ii) review agency publicity under the abuse of discretion 
standard, and (iii) hold that agency publicity is reviewable as final 
agency action if the private party can demonstrate some tangible 
harm and present evidence that the agency intended the publicity, at 
least in part, to punish or sanction. 
1. Statutory reform 
Ideally, Congress would clarify which agencies could issue 
adverse publicity, under what circumstances, and via what 
procedures. Gellhorn’s suggestions are still worth pursuing.438 
However, I propose what might be a simpler and more 
straightforward legislative intervention: Congress should pass a 
statute, perhaps as part of the APA, that clarifies that agencies have 
discretion to issue publicity and notify the public (and publish 
written policies to this extent), but that exercising such discretion 
within an agency policy is subject to judicial review for an abuse of 
discretion. 
Had this standard been in place, it might have encouraged 
agencies to be more careful in several of the cases above. For 
example, if the FDA were subject to an abuse of discretion standard 
in the SuperGen case,439 the agency might have notified SuperGen of 
its objections before publicizing them, and this early notification 
might have led SuperGen to correct or retract the misleading 
statements about its drug. If the SEC were subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard in the Goldman Sachs case,440 it might have been 
more careful to notify Goldman Sachs of the complaint before filing 
it, and it may have filed the complaint during nontrading hours to 
avoid the market reaction. In the recent E. coli and salmonella cases, 
the FDA might have been quicker and more careful at clarifying the 
scope of its warnings, which may have reduced the $200 million and 
$350 million fall-outs.441  
 
 438. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1435–39. 
 439. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 440. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 441. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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In conjunction with “abuse of discretion” review, Congress 
should delegate to each agency the responsibility to codify its own 
procedures for issuing publicity. Perhaps as a separate reform, 
Congress should enhance agencies’ statutory enforcement authority, 
so that extrastatutory tactics are not clearly preferable to agencies. 
On this latter point, Gellhorn noted that adverse publicity used 
to sanction can forestall both agencies and Congress from 
considering and testing other forms of sanctions.442 There is a certain 
irony here—by using adverse publicity as an extrastatutory 
enforcement tool, agencies might deter Congress from granting 
more enforcement powers, or perhaps more funding to carry out 
existing enforcement authority that requires more resources. 
Agencies should not make the executive decision to grant themselves 
more power; Congress must do it.443 Indeed, as was true nearly four 
decades ago, “[t]he best solution would be for Congress to face the 
choice of extending agency sanctions or of authorizing publicity as a 
sanction.”444 
2. Judicial review 
In the more likely event that Congress does not intervene with 
specific reforms, courts should review agency publicity for an abuse 
of discretion. But this will require courts to resolve several open legal 
questions that have persisted since 1973, including whether agency 
publicity is judicially reviewable, where the cause of action resides, 
and whether agency decisions are immune from challenge.  
a. Is agency publicity reviewable? The threshold question is 
whether courts may even review agency publicity. Courts and 
scholars have long expressed concern that without judicial review, 
agencies will abuse their discretion. One court worried that the 
FDA’s practices might allow it to “effectively regulate industry 
without ever exposing itself to judicial review.”445  
Parties challenging agency publicity must surmount a number of 
obstacles. The APA allows courts to review only “agency action” that 
is “final.”446 Challengers must exhaust administrative remedies before 
 
 442. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1421. 
 443. Id. at 1424.  
 444. Id. at 1424 n.179. 
 445. Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 446. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704 (2006). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1442 
seeking judicial ones. And their complaint must be ripe for review. 
Agency publicity complicates the traditional doctrinal analyses here.  
Though there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends 
judicial review of administrative action,”447 courts routinely decline 
to review adverse agency publicity,448 finding that it is neither an 
“agency action” nor “final” as the APA defines those terms.  
This conclusion is problematic for several reasons. First, when an 
agency publishes a press release to punish or deter a company, it 
would arguably qualify under the APA’s definition of “agency 
action,” which includes “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, 
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof.”449 Of 
these possibilities, courts generally find that agency publicity could 
qualify only as a “sanction.” The APA defines “sanction” as “an 
agency . . . prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition 
affecting the freedom of a person[, or] . . . taking other compulsory 
or restrictive action.”450 The legislative history to the APA reveals 
that Congress recognized that adverse publicity could be a sanction 
and that this was a “troublesome subject” when the agency did not 
have statutory authority.451 Although the D.C. Circuit has steadily 
retreated from its assertion sixty years ago that adverse agency 
publicity is never reviewable under the APA,452 it has never 
encountered publicity fit to review. For example, the D.C. Circuit 
has noted that “adverse impact alone would not necessarily make 
agency publicity reviewable as a sanction,” explaining that an 
aggrieved firm would have to show evidence that the agency 
intended to penalize the company or that the publicity was false.453 
The party might demonstrate intent by showing that the publicity 
“caused destruction of property or revocation of a license.”454 
 
 447. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
 448. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836 (citing Doe v. United States, 83 F. 
Supp. 2d 833, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2000)). 
 449. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). 
 450. Id. at § 551(10)(a), (g). 
 451. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 40 (1946) (House of Representatives Report on APA)).  
 452. Hearst Radio v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (refusing to review FCC’s 
publication of a report titled “Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees” that 
criticized one of Hearst’s stations). 
 453. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1119. 
 454. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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Otherwise, it can be exceedingly difficult to prove an agency’s intent 
to sanction and thus qualify as “agency action.” 
Second, if a separate statute does not specifically grant judicial 
review, the APA allows courts to review only “final” agency actions 
rather than tentative, intermediate, or interlocutory decisions.455 
Courts have interpreted finality to mean that the agency’s decision is 
the consummation of its decision making process and determines a 
party’s legal rights or obligations, or otherwise has some legal 
consequence for the party.456 The difficulty is that when agencies 
issue publicity, it is virtually never intended to represent a binding or 
final determination.457 Dating back to the 1948 opinion in Hearst 
Radio v. FCC,458 the D.C. Circuit has never found an agency press 
release to be “final agency action.”459 Although the D.C. Circuit has 
backed away from this position, it has yet to hold otherwise.460  
 
 455. APA § 704, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Some courts treat the APA’s requirement of 
“final agency action” as jurisdictional, but the D.C. Circuit recently took pains to clarify that it 
is not. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183–85 (D.C. Cir. 2006). As the court explained, “the 
APA . . . is not a jurisdiction-conferring statute” and “what its judicial review provisions . . . do 
provide is a limited cause of action for parties adversely affected by agency action.” Id. at 183, 
185. Thus, the “final agency action” requirement speaks to a party’s cause of action rather than 
a court’s jurisdiction. Courts in most circumstances would have jurisdiction to hear such cases 
under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 185; see also Ajay 
Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 215–16 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d, 513 F.2d 625 
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that the court had jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear action 
for equitable relief against individual agency officials that issued press releases and other public 
statements). In fact, on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the FTC abandoned its earlier arguments 
that APA §§ 702 and 704 bar jurisdiction to review the agency’s press releases. Trudeau, 456 
F.3d at 183, 185. The D.C. Circuit thus held that APA § 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
applied regardless of whether the press release constituted “final” agency action under § 704. 
Id. at 187. For more discussion, see infra Part V.C.2.b. 
 456. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); Bennett v. Spear, 520 
U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); Ciba-Geigy 
Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 435–36 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 457. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 512. 
 458. 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
 459. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 189. Note that in Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 
849 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), the court did not hold that the 
USDA’s decision to publicize adverse information was “final agency action,” but declared that 
it was “disinclined to find that no agency action has taken place.”  
 460. Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 849, 850 (stating that the court has “reason to question 
the continued validity of the Hearst Radio decision” and that its application barring review 
would be “troubling,” but nevertheless finding the claim barred by the statute of limitations 
and declining to reconsider Hearst); see also Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 189. 
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Courts seem to intuit that agency publicity is not categorically 
unreviewable, particularly when it is false or contrary to statute.461 
But I found only one judicial opinion holding that an agency’s 
public statements were final, and that holding was largely motivated 
by the company’s allegations of “serious, immediate and continuing 
injury to its business.”462 Most courts find that a press release is not 
final agency action, even when the court recognizes the harms and 
the likelihood that agency hearings after the fact will not provide 
relief.463  
In Trudeau, as noted above, the D.C. District Court noted that 
for a press release to qualify as “final,” the plaintiff would have to 
produce at least one, and preferably two, types of evidence: first, 
“evidence that the agency was intent on penalizing a private party 
through adverse publicity”; and, second, “evidence that the press 
release was demonstrably or concededly false.”464  
It is not clear why the truth or falsity of the agency’s press release 
is relevant to finality, given that the standard for finality is whether 
the action marks the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process,” and either determines the private party’s legal rights or 
obligations or has some other legal consequence.465 A truthful and 
accurate press release could mark the consummation of an agency’s 
decision-making process and determine a party’s legal rights or 
obligations or have some other legal consequence, but a false press 
release might not, particularly because an agency’s false statements 
generally do not give rise to libel or defamation claims. Nevertheless, 
the court in Trudeau recognized that courts must review agency 
press releases “with care,” and that they reside “at the outermost 
boundaries of the definitions of both ‘final’ and ‘agency action.’”466  
 
 461. Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 849. 
 462. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1053–54 (D. Del. 
1976). 
 463. Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, 391 F. Supp. 841, 846–48 (S.D. Tex. 1975). In Relco Inc. v. 
CPSC, the court seemed to conflate finality with exhaustion when it said that even though the 
CPSC’s press release condemning the plaintiff’s products was “final in its practical effect, the 
review of the warning must initially be brought before the agency and is not final at law until it 
is so brought.” Id. at 847. 
 464. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289–90 (D.D.C. 2005) (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
 465. Id. at 289 (citing Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 482 
(2004)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). 
 466. Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
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Agency publicity also complicates the question of finality because 
publicity generally causes harm via third parties. Some courts have 
declined to review agency actions that cause third parties to take 
action against a product or company.467 Others have been more 
sympathetic if the agency makes a statement about a product and a 
party suffers direct economic injury because of it.468 However, most 
courts do not allow challenges to proceed if the agency publicity is 
persuasive or produces only “coercive pressures on third parties” and 
does not otherwise signal final agency action.469 Agencies themselves 
point out that they cannot control how parties interpret the 
information they release or what they will do with it.470 Thus, the 
erroneous agency press release that causes a firm’s stock to plummet 
might escape review. 
Third, parties must exhaust their administrative remedies before 
seeking judicial review, and most agencies provide no administrative 
remedies for adverse publicity. But sometimes parties can seek 
judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies if the 
administrative procedures and remedies cannot provide effective 
relief. Thus, if an agency has procedures that allow parties to ask that 
adverse publicity be corrected or retracted by the agency, courts 
 
 467. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 513 (citing Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4th Cir. 2002), in which the 
Fourth Circuit held that the EPA publishing a report about the health risks of secondhand 
tobacco was not reviewable under the APA, even though independent third parties would react 
negatively to the report, and expressing concern that “if [the court] were to adopt the position 
that agency actions producing only pressures on third parties were reviewable under the APA, 
then almost any agency policy or publication issued by the government would be subject to 
judicial review”). See also Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224, 1229–30 (D. 
Md. 1979) (finding a report by the FDA comparing certain generic to brand name drugs 
unreviewable for lack of “agency action” because the FDA intended to educate and inform the 
public, despite concerns by brand name manufacturers that consumers would purchase 
generics instead). 
 468. Tozzi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 304 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (finding that a manufacturer had standing and that the agency’s decision was reviewable 
by the court, but ultimately deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations); 
O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 517–18. 
 469. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 458–59 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting the PTO’s argument); Flue-Cured Tobacco, 313 F.3d at 860–61 (holding that an 
EPA report classifying secondhand smoke as a carcinogen did not constitute “final agency 
action” under the APA because it produced “only coercive pressures on third parties” rather 
than any “direct and appreciable legal consequences” for the plaintiffs (quoting Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997))). 
 470. E.g., FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 
(Mar. 4, 1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
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would typically require parties to submit such a request before 
seeking judicial review.471 Even if agencies do not, at least one court 
has allowed a company to bypass administrative procedures because 
it alleged that the agency’s statements “have caused and will 
continue to cause severe damage” to the company’s business.472 
Thus, courts may be sympathetic if the harm is immediate and 
agency procedures offer no real administrative remedies. 
Fourth, even if adverse publicity constitutes final agency action, 
it must also be ripe for review.473 One court rejected an agency’s 
motion to dismiss on this ground, finding that FDA threats in a 
warning letter essentially “demand[ed] compliance” with the 
agency’s position and was more definitive, final, and harmful than in 
most cases because the FDA said it would take action and had 
already “utilized the public press to enforce its determination.”474 
The court found that the company was in a Catch-22—either 
comply with the FDA’s demands or risk enforcement action.475 But 
courts sometimes decline to review pre-enforcement publicity even 
when recognizing that it has a significant practical effect.476 
 
 471. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 514. 
 472. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (D. Del. 
1976). In that case, the CPSC made several public statements in a press release, an agency 
news publication, and in a Federal Register notice about problems with aluminum wiring in 
anticipation of initiating rulemaking to develop safety standards. Even though the statements 
did not mention the manufacturer or its particular products, the court held that the 
manufacturer should not have to exhaust the lengthy rulemaking process to challenge actions 
that could damage its sales, goodwill, and business relationships, explaining that a wait of over 
two years for the rulemaking to conclude would be “unduly harsh.” Id. at 1050–51, 1055. 
 473. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) 
(allowing pre-enforcement judicial review of FDA rule requiring brand name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to also list the product’s generic name in various situations because 
manufacturers either had to expend significant expense changing their labeling or risk a 
subsequent enforcement action by the FDA). 
 474. Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, Civ. A. No. MJG-92-444, 1992 WL 208962, at *4–5 (D. 
Md. Aug. 17, 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 475. Id. at *5 (noting that “Den-Mat can proceed with its current business operation and 
risk serious civil and criminal penalties, or cease operations and suffer severe economic loss 
while it pursues the lengthy new drug application process (which it considers unwarranted),” 
but acknowledging that “[t]his dilemma may well be part of the cost of business and not an 
undue burden”). 
 476. In Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, the court granted the CPSC’s motion to dismiss, even 
though its press release warning consumers to immediately stop using Relco’s welders “carried 
with it finality in its most certain and practical sense.” 391 F. Supp. 841, 846–47 (S.D. Tex. 
1975). The court told Relco to utilize the “full hearing after the fact” even though “it may 
offer no relief.” Id. at 847. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:50 PM 
1371 Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies 
 1447 
Courts should relax these four requirements or interpret them 
liberally when the party can make a prima facie case that the agency 
has abused its discretion. This would allow courts to preview the 
substantive cause of action. Particularly if there is evidence that an 
agency intends for the publicity to function as a sanction, courts 
should treat the statement as final agency action subject to judicial 
review under the APA.477 If removing this extrastatutory sanction 
unduly ties agencies’ hands, then Congress should authorize more 
efficient statutory enforcement powers. 
b. What cause of action? Another major unresolved question is 
whether there is a suitable cause of action against agency publicity. 
Each of the following might work, given certain factual predicates.  
First, the APA itself might provide a cause of action. APA § 704 
“suppl[ies] a generic cause of action in favor of persons aggrieved by 
agency action.”478 And APA § 706 directs courts to “hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action” that is “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”479 
But plaintiffs relying on the APA for a cause of action can only sue if 
the action is “final” under APA § 704.480 And of course, the D.C. 
Circuit has “never found a press release . . . to constitute final agency 
action under the APA.”481 Even so, the D.C. Circuit has stated that 
when agency publicity does cause harm, “courts have the duty to 
decide whether there is a remedy under the APA for the release of 
the information.”482 Thus, although the APA seems to provide a 
relatively direct path to challenge agency publicity, such challenges 
have yet to succeed. 
 
 477. Lawrence A. Walke, Federal Agency Publications: The Availability of Judicial Review, 
69 WASH. U. L. Q. 1267, 1275–76 (1991) (noting that agency intent should help determine 
whether agency publications are reviewable). In American Trucking Association v. United 
States, 755 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1985), the court considered the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s intent in releasing a report on how deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s 
affected the trucking industry economically. Because the Commission published the report to 
educate and inform the public rather than affect the trucking industry’s legal rights, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the report was not reviewable. Id. at 1297. 
 478. Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 
1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997). 
 479. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006); Trudeau 
v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
 480. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 188. 
 481. Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 482. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118–19 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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Second, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) might provide a 
cause of action, but scholars examining potential remedies have 
concluded that the FTCA provides no relief.483 The FTCA generally 
waives sovereign immunity that agencies enjoy under the 11th 
Amendment, thus allowing private parties to sue the federal 
government in tort under certain defined circumstances.484 But the 
FTCA specifically excludes libel, slander, and other statements by 
government agents that would qualify as intentional torts,485 and 
courts have interpreted this as also excluding press releases.486 
O’Reilly concludes that “the consistent view of courts, 
commentators and career FTCA defenders is that any intentionally-
caused federal agency disclosure, which causes reputational injury, is 
not actionable under the FTCA.”487 There is also a major exemption 
under the FTCA for discretionary functions, which courts have 
interpreted as including not only the decision to issue press 
releases,488 but also the underlying data upon which agencies rely.489 
There are several cases dismissing FTCA causes of action for 
damaging statements to the media or other forms of adverse 
publicity.490  
Third, plaintiffs unable to assert a cause of action against an 
agency under a general or specific statute may still bring a 
“nonstatutory” action if the “agency is charged with acting beyond 
 
 483. See, e.g., O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838, 849 (citing Banfi Prods. 
Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 581 (1998)); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, 
supra note 7, at 520, 522 (analyzing whether the FTCA might provide remedies to inaccurate 
or misleading statements on agency websites). 
 484. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680. 
 485. Id. § 2680(h). 
 486. Fisher Bros. Sales v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1995); Banfi, 41 Fed. 
Cl. at 583–84; Lance Indus., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 762, 777–78 (Cl. Ct. 1983); 
O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849. 
 487. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 522. 
 488. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 125–26 
(Fed. Cl. 1997). 
 489. See, e.g., Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(dismissing action against FDA under the Federal Tort Claims Act because the FDA’s decision 
to publicize and recall fruit imported from Chile upon an anonymous tip and faulty laboratory 
testing fell within the discretionary function exemption to Act). 
 490. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 837–38 (S.D. Tex. 2000) 
(citing numerous cases, including those involving public statements and press releases by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the General Services 
Administration, the Immigration and Nationality Service, and the Treasury Department). 
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its authority.”491 Thus, ultra vires actions are available, although they 
are “intended to be of extremely limited scope.”492 And, as noted 
above, such a challenge would be difficult given that most agencies 
can probably justify their use of publicity under extremely broad 
statutory grants of authority.493 
Fourth, perhaps the most intuitive cause of action would be a 
procedural due process claim when an agency issues adverse publicity 
without notifying the subject or allowing it to respond. However, 
my survey of the cases since 1973 show that very few parties make 
due process claims,494 and the parties that do get only superficial 
treatment in judicial opinions.495 In some cases, a party seemed to 
have a due process claim but did not assert it. In others, the agency 
provided some informal mechanism for the party to comment or 
object beforehand. Rarely do modern agencies release adverse 
publicity without first notifying the private party of the agencies’ 
objections.496 Sometimes, agencies even allow the company that is 
the subject of the press release to review and comment on the press 
release before it is published, and even request changes or submit its 
own language.497 But agency practices vary. 
 
 491. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 189–90 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Dart v. United 
States, 848 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 492. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 190 (citing Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 842 
F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 493. See supra Part II.A.  
 494. Only four of the twenty-six opinions surveyed involving adverse agency publicity 
since 1973 discussed due process claims. See Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 837 F.2d 1119, 1121–22 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 
722 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 
1980); Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d mem., 513 
F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 495. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1121–22; Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 851; Sears, 
Roebuck, 504 F. Supp. 268–70. 
 496. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. Moreover, even when agency regulations 
allow the subjects of investigations to submit written statements before the agency brings a 
formal enforcement action, such regulations may not be mandatory and may not create any 
procedural rights for the subject. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341, 352–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that subject of SEC enforcement action had no constitutional or 
statutory procedural right to enforce SEC regulation that allowed the subjects of investigations 
to comment prior to formal enforcement). 
 497. Agencies may go to great lengths to solicit a company’s feedback before issuing 
potentially adverse publicity. For example, in Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 
107, 118 (Fed. Cl. 1997), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms allowed a wine 
importer to review drafts of its press release and request changes and submit its own language.  
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It also seems more difficult than it should be for companies to 
show that they have a sufficient liberty or property interest that 
triggers due process rights. Consumer demand for products may be 
sensitive to real or perceived sanctioning by the government. Courts 
have acknowledged that negative statements about a product can 
affect a company’s “cognizable property interest” for due process 
purposes, although it is much more difficult to show that an agency’s 
statements actually deprived the manufacturer of that property 
interest absent some showing that the agency effectively revoked a 
license.498 In other cases, courts seem to require the agency 
statement to be false or inaccurate in some way, as if an accurate-but-
damaging statement could not deprive a party of due process.499 My 
research did not find any successful due process claims. 
Fifth, parties could assert more creative constitutional violations. 
For example, plaintiffs have alleged that agencies use publicity as 
retaliation, in violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.500 But 
courts have yet to determine whether agency publicity meets the 
elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim.501 And Noah 
observes that “the Takings Clause imposes no serious constraints” 
on agencies that use adverse publicity or other forms of arm-
twisting.502 Agencies generally use adverse publicity to force 
companies to waive statutory rights rather than constitutional 
ones.503 Plaintiffs have also asserted that agency publicity violates the 
Bill of Attainder Clause.504 Each of these constitutional claims seems 
stretched when used to attack agency publicity. 
 
 498. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1119, 1122. For example, when Sears complained 
that the EEOC leaked its complaint to the public and “engaged in a media harassment 
campaign against” it, the reviewing court found that the alleged damages to its reputation and 
goodwill did not show “stigma plus” a more tangible liberty or property interest, such as 
decreased sales. Sears, Roebuck, 504 F. Supp. at 268–69. See also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 WL 108, at *10–11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1980). 
 499. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1122 (noting that industry buyers who shift to 
other products is an “indirect effect” on the aggrieved manufacturers and if “not demonstrated 
to be false can hardly be said to constitute a constitutional deprivation of property.”). 
 500. See, e.g., Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 
F.3d 178,190 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 501. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 191 & n.23. 
 502. Noah, supra note 7, at 916. 
 503.  Id. at 917. 
 504. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. For example, Sears claimed that when the EEOC 
leaked its complaint against Sears and released adverse publicity, it punished Sears without a 
judicial trial. The court spent little time dispatching with this argument because the Bill of 
Attainder Clause was intended to prevent “trial by legislature,” and the EEOC is an 
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Sixth, causes of action might arise when public statements attach 
to more official agency procedures, like rulemaking, though it is 
difficult to envision a successful case.505 
As a last resort, some parties have tried to seek relief via private 
bills in Congress, by which a house of Congress adopts a specific bill 
asking the Court of Federal Claims to determine whether the 
government should compensate the party for injuries caused by a 
federal agency.506 Congress then adopts a private law approving the 
compensation, which must be signed by the President,507 but the 
Court of Federal Claims routinely denies claims against agencies for 
adverse publicity.508 Because an agency’s decision to issue publicity 
 
investigative rather than a legislative agency and had not punished Sears. EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (quoting United States v. Brown, 
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 WL 108, 
at *10–11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1980) (refusing to determine whether the EEOC has legislative 
functions because its actions did not punish Sears). 
 505. For example, Kaiser Aluminum sued the CPSC after it made several public 
statements about problems with aluminum wiring, without naming Kaiser specifically. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1050–52 (D. Del. 1976). The court 
refused to dismiss Kaiser’s action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies despite Kaiser 
being able to comment during rulemaking, because rulemaking would not provide an adequate 
remedy for the CPSC’s public statements. Id. at 1055–56. However, the court denied Kaiser’s 
motion for a preliminary restraining order. Id. at 1064. FDA publicity surrounding rulemaking 
for health foods and dietary supplements was similarly upheld in part because the FDA’s 
statements criticized the entire industry rather than specific manufacturers. Ajay Nutrition 
Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 218–19 (D.N.J. 1974) (“[T]his Court holds that an 
entire industry, such as the health food processing industry, cannot sue on grounds of 
defamation.”), aff’d mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). The FDA has defended its ability to 
release information during rulemaking, arguing that it would be inappropriate to limit this 
information because “[r]ules apply generally and affect a wide number of persons.” FDA 
Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 506. 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (2006); Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 581, 
584 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (refusing to grant compensation to wine importer for FDA allegedly 
negligently identifying wine as a health hazard because Banfi did not have a valid legal or 
equitable claim against the United States); Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 
107, 140 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (refusing to grant compensation to wine importer after Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms requested recall and issued press release announcing allegedly 
tainted wine based on FDA’s testing); Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 
625, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (refusing to grant compensation to dish importer after FDA press 
releases stated that dishes were harmful); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, 
at 540.  
 507. 28 U.S.C. § 2509; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 540. 
 508. Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 140; Cal. Canners & Growers Ass’n v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 
774, 784–86 (Ct. Cl. 1986) (denying compensation to a fruit growers’ association after 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, FDA Commissioner, and Surgeon General made 
public statements that artificial sweetener was carcinogenic in animals, was not generally 
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generally falls within exemptions under the FTCA, this also often 
precludes recovery in private bills.509 As long as the agency has a 
rational basis for issuing the publicity and did not make an error, 
courts will be reluctant to grant compensation.510 Parties rarely 
recover compensation this way, and some scholars speculate that an 
agency’s offending statement “would need to be exceedingly severe 
in its negative impact to warrant the huge lobbying and litigation 
investment that a private bill would require.”511  
It should be noted that regardless of the specific cause of action, 
aggrieved parties will have difficulty proving their injuries. 
Companies often realize during litigation that it is exceedingly 
difficult to prove sufficiently concrete injuries that would sustain any 
kind of preliminary injunction or other remedies the courts might 
grant.512  
Considering these causes of action, parties would seem to have 
the best chance of success under the APA or via the due process 
clause. But even these claims routinely fail.  
c. Are agencies immune from suit? A final unresolved question is 
whether agencies are immune from challenge. When agency officials 
are sued in their individual capacities to avoid issues of sovereign 
immunity, those officials can invoke executive privilege to make 
public statements.513 Moreover, at least one court has speculated that 
 
recognized as safe, and should not be used in human foods, primarily because statements were 
not erroneous based on data at the time); Lance Indus., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 762, 
780 (Ct. Cl. 1983) (denying compensation to manufacturer of self-defense spray because 
federal and state enforcement agencies did not negligently fail to verify rumor that spray caused 
debilitating damages before the information was circulated throughout government 
enforcement agencies and publicized by media); Sperling & Schwartz, 218 Ct. Cl. at 627 
(holding that dish importers did not have legal or equitable claim against the FDA for issuing 
press releases that identified products as harmful). 
 509. Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 125–26.  
 510. See, e.g., Sperling & Schwartz, 218 Ct. Cl. at 626–27. 
 511. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 540. 
 512. For example, after Kaiser Aluminum sued the CPSC for public statements it made 
while initiating rulemaking to set standards for aluminum wiring, the court found that even if 
those statements damaged Kaiser’s business, the damage caused would not be any greater than 
damage caused by the public rulemaking procedure itself. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. 
CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1063 (D. Del. 1976). 
 513. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding executive privilege against defamation 
claim for press release by Acting Director of Office of Rent Stabilization announcing his intent 
to suspend employees). In Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, a district court held that the 
FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare were protected by the executive privilege when making public statements and issuing 
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government agencies themselves might have a First Amendment 
right to issue publicity, and that courts “should be hesitant to 
restrain the Government in speaking out about matters of public 
concern absent some very strong overriding showing of 
inappropriate harm.”514 
These hurdles collectively suggest that agencies impose standards 
on themselves, and that courts hold agencies to these standards, 
reviewing for an abuse of discretion in appropriate circumstances. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article takes a fresh look at how modern agencies use 
modern media against modern regulated parties. Federal agencies 
continue to use adverse publicity despite long-standing concerns that 
the publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading, or wrong. 
Agency announcements often bypass more formal enforcement 
tools—sometimes purposefully so. Most agencies do not have 
statutory authority to issue adverse publicity, particularly when used 
to sanction. And courts generally find that agency publicity is either 
not reviewable, or if it is, not redressable. Agencies thus enjoy 
virtually boundless discretion to brandish adverse publicity. 
Today, the problem is magnified. Overburdened agencies have 
more incentives to eschew formal statutory enforcement. Adverse 
publicity is less costly, more effective, and essentially immune from 
judicial review. New media allows agencies to make announcements 
via their websites, or even via Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
media du jour. These truncated formats are more susceptible to 
being mischaracterized or misunderstood. And hyper-responsive 
capital markets can process adverse publicity more swiftly and hastily, 
which amplifies all these problems.  
This Article offers several ways to cabin agency discretion. Some 
reiterate what Gellhorn and ACUS urged nearly four decades ago, 
and some are entirely new, based on developments since then. The 
 
press releases critical of regulated industries. Key to the court’s opinion was the statutory 
authority granted to the FDA to use its discretion to disseminate information publicly. 378 F. 
Supp. 210, 216–17 (D.N.J. 1974) (citing FDA’s authority under 21 U.S.C. § 375), aff’d 
mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 514. FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1070–71 (D. Utah 1997) 
(acknowledging that counsel for the government “asserted that there was no First Amendment 
interest” and that no courts had considered a government agency’s right to speak apart from 
individual employees’ rights). 
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next step is for Congress, courts, or agencies to revisit the issue, as all 
three seem desensitized to the problem since the original ACUS 
recommendations highlighted them. The legitimacy of agency 
actions is important. Regulated firms voluntarily comply with agency 
regulations as much out of respect for their necessity and 
legitimacy515 as out of fear.516 
These recommendations would undoubtedly tie agencies’ hands. 
And in an era when agencies often struggle to fulfill their statutory 
responsibilities and adequately enforce their regulations, one can 
reasonably question why we should further constrain agencies. 
Resource-constrained agencies should be able to use whatever 
leverage they can muster. 
This Article recognizes that agency publicity is part of a larger 
story about regulatory enforcement in imperfect conditions. 
Agencies should have wide discretion to issue publicity, but should 
not be able to abuse that power. And if this unduly constrains their 
ability to encourage compliance with their regulatory schemes, 
Congress should not only authorize agencies to take more efficient 
enforcement actions by statute, but should also provide them the 
necessary resources to do so. Until then, agencies, courts, and 
Congress should impose some standards on agencies. 
 
 
 515. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
 516. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REPUTATION AT THE FDA 654–660 (2010). 
